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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Research on intergenerational economic mobility receives a high level of attention 
by scholars and policy makers and is also subject to media coverage and thus 
everyday conversation.1
As an illustration consider two societies A and B. Society A is characterized 
by strong associations between parent’s economic status (for example earnings) 
and the economic status of their children. In this society the economic outcome 
of a child is fully predetermined by the economic success or failure of his / her 
parents. In contrast, in society B, the associations between parental and offspring’s 
economic status are weak, so the economic outcome of a child is independent of 
the economic performance of his / her parents. In this example society B displays 
complete intergenerational mobility while society A is characterized by complete 
immobility (Björklund and Jäntti, 2009; Solon, 1999).
Apparently, as in society A own economic outcome is not dependent on 
own decisions, but is fully dependent on the economic outcome of one’s parents, 
equality of opportunities are lower in society A compared to society B. Therefore, 
the level of intergenerational mobility can be seen as a key indicator for the degree 
of equality of opportunities in a society.
Most modern countries see the provision of a high level of equality of 
opportunities as a normative goal policy should reach. This can be motivated 
either from a social perspective or an efficiency reasoning. First, a low level 
of intergenerational mobility and thus a low level of equality of opportunities 
leads to a society in which the economic position of a family is determined over 
generations. While this might be a comfortable situation at the upper end of 
the distribution, it is discouraging at the lower end. A situation like this can 
lead to the formation of parallel societies with all negative social consequences. 
Second, a low level of intergenerational mobility is also negative in terms of the 
efficient allocation of resources in a society. If an individual does not get a job 
for which he / she is qualified, just because of the economic situation of his / her 
parents, this is an inefficient use of the societies’ human capital stock. On the 
other hand if an unqualified individual gets a good job only because of his / her 
family background, this is also not an efficient use of societies’ resources. So if 
higher intergenerational mobility is associated with a more efficient use of human 
1 See for example Solon (1999) and Black and Devereux (2011) for an overview of the economic literature. Examples 
for media coverage can be found in Faigle (2011) and Rampell (2010).
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capital, abolishing mobility barriers could even contribute to economic growth in 
a society.
The last decades have witnessed a rapid increase in the number of studies in 
the economic literature on intergenerational mobility. As discussed in more detail 
in chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation, variation in the estimates for different 
countries is difficult to interpret if these estimates rely on information from single 
country studies. These studies can differ in the composition of the samples and 
the applied method (Solon, 2002). As it is not clear whether these variations lead 
to changes of the same sign and magnitude in the estimates of intergenerational 
mobility in different countries or not, international comparisons have to focus on 
studies including multiple countries. Therefore, apart from theoretical contributions 
and empirical analyses for single countries, a third strand of literature evolved 
focusing on cross-country comparisons. Based on the results of such cross-country 
studies, most researchers by now agree on the widely accepted stylized fact that 
the US is among the countries with the lowest level of intergenerational mobility 
while the Scandinavian countries mark the end of the scale with the highest 
mobility (Solon, 2002).
Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation contribute to this strand of the 
literature. As presented in detail in the two chapters, in contrast to the US 
and the Scandinavian countries, the existing evidence on the position of 
Germany in an international ranking of intergenerational mobility is at best 
inconclusive. Therefore, first, chapter 2 picks up the traditional method to 
measure intergenerational mobility and sheds new light on the question whether 
intergenerational mobility is higher or lower in Germany as compared to the US. 
Second, chapter 3 presents a three country comparison of Germany, Denmark, and 
the US measuring intergenerational mobility based on a broader mobility measure, 
which captures the influence of full family background instead of only parental 
income or earnings like in the standard approach. The aim of both chapters is 
to clarify the evidence on the position of Germany in an international ranking 
of intergenerational mobility. Third, while chapters 2 and 3 as cross-country 
comparisons are of a descriptive character, chapter  4 takes a closer look at the 
determinants of the intergenerational transmission process. Using unique Danish 
administrative data on second generation immigrants, the analysis answers the 
question whether cultural background matters in the determination of the level 
of intergenerational mobility.
Economic mobility has also another dimension. Intragenerational economic 
mobility describes how likely it is for an individual to improve (or to worsen) 
his / her economic position in his / her own generation. As introduced by Friedman 
(1962) economic mobility (e.g., measured as wage mobility) can equalize long-term 
13Chapter 1
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economic status. Especially in a situation of high or rising economic inequality, a 
high level of economic mobility involves that being in a disadvantaged economic 
situation might be only a transitory and not a permanent experience for an 
individual.
This closely relates intragenerational economic mobility to the idea of equality 
of opportunities described above. For example, given a constant level of medium to 
high economic inequality, the absence of mobility would condemn disadvantaged 
individuals to stay at the bottom of the distribution, irrespective of their decisions 
and effort. Again, like in the example of intergenerational mobility this would have 
negative effects on social stability and the productivity in a society. The difference 
compared to the case of intergenerational mobility is that the initial advantage 
or disadvantage does not have to be connected to the economic status of the 
parents. Of course, as economic mobility also increases the risk of worsening an 
individual’s economic situation, it is arguable whether there is a tradeoff between 
the level of inequality and the level of mobility. However, even with this restriction, 
in the sense of equality of opportunities it is obvious that in a situation of rising 
inequality, most modern societies would prefer this rise to be accompanied with a 
rise in economic mobility. Thus they would prefer a situation with a high mobility 
in which a disadvantaged individual can improve his / her situation by own decisions 
or effort.
Motivated by recent evidence on rising wage inequality in Germany 
(Dustmann et al., 2009), chapter 5 of this dissertation contributes to the literature 
on intragenerational mobility by analyzing the development of wage mobility in 
East and West Germany.
1.2 Organization of this dissertation
This dissertation consists of four contributions, which are described in this section. 
Each of the chapters is intended to be a stand-alone analysis. While the first three 
studies are single authored, the study on wage mobility in East and West Germany 
is coauthored with Regina T. Riphahn.
1.2.1  A new look at intergenerational mobility in Germany compared  
to the US
The unclear position of Germany in an international ranking of intergenerational 
mobility motivates this chapter. First, I apply the standard approach in the existing 
literature, estimating intergenerational earnings elasticities, and present a cross-
country comparison of intergenerational earnings mobility in Germany and the US. 
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Second, recent findings stress the importance of nonlinearities in the relationship 
between the father’s and the son’s earnings (Bratsberg et al., 2007). Thus, I test for 
nonlinearities in this relationship in both countries. In addition, I extend the classical 
test for nonlinearities with results from an unconditional quantile regression (Firpo 
et al., 2009). The existing literature focuses on nonlinearities along the distribution 
of the father’s earnings, which are the origin of the intergenerational transmission 
process. In contrast, the unconditional quantile regression provides a method for 
looking at nonlinearities along the distribution of the son’s earnings, which are the 
result of the transmission process.
1.2.2  How important is the family? Evidence from sibling correlations  
in permanent earnings in the US, Germany, and Denmark
Likewise motivated by the lack of clear empirical evidence on Germany, this 
chapter contains a three country analysis covering Germany, Denmark, and the US. 
In contrast to the approach in chapter 2, I use sibling correlations as a measure 
of intergenerational mobility. Compared to estimating intergenerational earnings 
elasticities, sibling correlations are a much broader measure of intergenerational 
mobility as they cover not only the influence of parental earnings but full parental 
background. I argue in the chapter, that, if intergenerational mobility is interpreted 
as an indicator of equality of opportunities, this broader measure should be 
preferred over the standard approach.
1.2.3  How important is cultural background for the level of intergenerational 
mobility? 
In contrast to chapters 2 and 3 which describe the strength of the association 
between parental earnings and the earnings of the offspring, this chapter takes a 
closer look at the potential determinants of the transmission process. These can 
be divided into factors related to the institutional setting in a society (e.g. the 
educational system) and factors related to the cultural background (e.g. parental 
attitudes) of the individuals. Using unique Danish administrative data I analyze 
intergenerational mobility for different groups of second generation immigrants. 
Thus, I can use variation in cultural background and control for the institutional 
setting. If institutions are the main determinant of intergenerational mobility, then 
different ethnic groups should show similar levels of intergenerational mobility. 
If, instead, cultural background matters most, the groups should differ in the 
estimated mobility levels. The article in this chapter is published in a recent issue 
of Economics Letters.
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1.2.4 Wage mobility in East and West Germany
This contribution is coauthored with Regina T. Riphahn. As results from recent 
research showed rising wage inequality in Germany (e.g. Dustmann et al., 2009) this 
chapter addresses the question whether this rise in inequality was accompanied by 
a change in wage mobility. Relying on recent long running administrative data we 
present descriptive evidence on wage mobility in West Germany for the period 
1975–2008 and in East Germany for the period 1992–2008. Thus, we identify long-
running patterns in wage mobility in both parts of the country. In the second part 
of the chapter, we develop hypotheses derived from the literature about potential 
factors explaining the observed mobility developments. Finally, we test these 
hypotheses using an innovative decomposition approach (Firpo et al., 2007; Fortin 
et al., 2011) based on recentered influence functions.
1.3 References
Björklund, A., Jäntti, M., 2009. Intergenerational income mobility and the role of 
family background. In: Salverda, W., Nolan, B., Smeeding, T. M. (Eds.), Oxford 
Handbook of Economic Inequality. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 491–521.
Black, S. E., Devereux, P. J., 2011. Recent developments in intergenerational mobility. 
In: Ashenfelter, O., Card, D. (Eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics. Vol. 4 Part B. 
Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 1487–1541.
Bratsberg, B., Røed, K., Raaum, O., Naylor, R., Jäntti, M., Eriksson, T., Österbacka, E., 
2007. Nonlinearities in intergenerational earnings mobility: Consequences for 
cross-country comparisons. Economic Journal 117 (519), C72–C92.
Dustmann, C., Ludsteck, J., Schönberg, U., 2009. Revisiting the German wage 
structure. Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (2), 843–881.
Faigle, P., 2011. Aufstieg, leichter als in den USA. Zeit online, http://www.zeit.
de / wirtschaft / 2011-04 / gerechtigkeit-aufstieg (last accessed on October 16th, 
2011).
Firpo, S., Fortin, N. M., Lemieux, T., 2007. Decomposing wage distributions using 
recentered influence regressions. mimeo, University of British Columbia.
Firpo, S., Fortin, N. M., Lemieux, T., 2009. Unconditional quantile regressions. 
Econometrica 77 (3), 953–973.
Fortin, N. M., Lemieux, T., Firpo, S., 2011. Decomposition methods in economics. 
In: Ashenfelter, O., Card, D. (Eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics. Vol. 4 Part A. 
Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 1–102.
Friedman, M., 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago University Press, Chicago.
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Rampell, C., 2010. Are you better off than your parents were? New York Times, 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com / 2010 / 02 / 10 / are-you-better-off-than-
your-parents-were (last accessed on October 16th, 2011).
Solon, G., 1999. Intergenerational mobility in the labor market. In: Ashenfelter, O., 
Card, D. (Eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics. Vol. 3 Part A. Elsevier, Amsterdam, 
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2  A new look at intergenerational mobility in Germany 
compared to the US
Daniel D. Schnitzlein
2.1 Introduction
The extent to which a family’s economic advantage or disadvantage persists over 
generations is widely seen as a key indicator of equality of opportunities. Thus, 
in both economics and sociology, a large field of research on intergenerational 
economic mobility has developed.2 Since the seminal articles by Solon (1992) 
and Zimmerman (1992), numerous contributions have analyzed intergenerational 
mobility in most of the developed and even some developing countries. Especially 
in economics, most contributions focus on the estimation of intergenerational 
earnings elasticities (hereafter IGEs) or intergenerational earnings correlations 
(hereafter IGCs) as measures of intergenerational mobility.
However, these estimates are highly sensitive to differences in sampling rules 
and the nature of the applied data sets (Solon, 2002). Therefore, international 
comparisons based on the results of single-country studies are difficult to interpret 
and can be misleading. Given these restrictions, scholars have developed a separate 
research strand that focuses on cross-country comparisons based on multiple 
countries in one study (e.g. Couch and Dunn, 1997; Björklund and Jäntti, 1997; 
Jäntti et al., 2006). The aim is to establish an international ranking system based 
on the level of intergenerational mobility. As intergenerational mobility is seen 
as a key indicator of equality of opportunities, which is a normative goal in most 
developed countries, an international ranking system provides evidence regarding 
the extent to which the goal of establishing a mobile society is fulfilled.
Existing results from cross-country comparisons provided the widely accepted 
stylized fact that intergenerational mobility is lowest in the US and highest in 
the Scandinavian countries (Björklund and Jäntti, 2000; Solon, 2002). The two 
extremes of the international intergenerational mobility scale, the US and the 
Scandinavian countries have received substantial attention in the literature. In 
contrast, empirical evidence on Germany is rare.
Based on theoretical considerations (Becker and Tomes, 1979, 1986; Solon, 
2004), which are discussed in more detail in section 2, one would expect Germany 
to have a higher level of intergenerational mobility than the US. However, the few 
2 See Solon (1999), Björklund and Jäntti (2009) and Black and Devereux (2011) for an overview of the economics 
literature and Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) and Breen (2004) for a review of the sociological literature.
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existing empirical results provide no clear evidence on this point. Couch and Dunn 
(1997) compared the level of intergenerational mobility in Germany and the US 
based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics (PSID). Based on two comparable samples, these researchers 
estimated IGEs and IGCs for both countries and found no significant differences.3 
Couch and Lillard (2004) compared German estimates that were also based on 
SOEP data with US estimates based on data from the National Longitudinal Survey 
(NLS).4 Their results support the findings of Couch and Dunn (1997).
To date, the empirical picture appears to be consistent, but recent 
methodological contributions have questioned these early findings. Haider 
and Solon (2006) showed that taking earnings observations too early (or too 
late) in an individual’s life cycle can cause substantial bias in the estimates of 
intergenerational mobility. As the authors of the aforementioned studies used 
SOEP data only up to 1998, the children observed in the German data were still 
very young. This problem carries over to the US data sets because the researchers 
had to construct comparable samples for both countries. Thus, the results of the 
comparisons presented above are only valid if the bias is of the same direction and 
magnitude in both countries.
Recent results from national studies have led scholars to question this 
assumption. Although Couch and Dunn (1997) estimate that the IGE for both 
countries is approximately 0.12, the consensus estimate in the literature for the 
IGE in the US lies between 0.4 and 0.5 (Corak, 2006),5 and recent German estimates 
range between 0.26 and 0.28 (Eisenhauer and Pfeiffer, 2008; Schnitzlein, 2009; 
Yuksel, 2009), which indicates higher intergenerational mobility in Germany 
compared with the US. However, because all of these recent contributions are 
single-country studies and therefore do not provide a US estimate based on a 
comparable sample, it might be misleading to draw conclusions about the rankings 
of the two countries. Thus, the empirical evidence remains unclear.
This chapter aims to clarify the contradictory evidence on German IGE 
estimates reported in the literature. I present a cross-country comparison of the 
intergenerational earnings mobility in Germany and the US that answers the 
following question: “Is intergenerational mobility higher in Germany than in the 
US?” In addition, I analyze whether the two countries differ in their structures of 
intergenerational mobility. Therefore, I extend the classical test for nonlinearities 
3 The authors update their results in Dunn and Couch (1999) and again find no differences between Germany and 
the US.
4 Couch and Lillard (2004) present their paper as an update of Lillard’s 2001 work, which also showed results for 
Germany and the US.
5 Based on long-running administrative data, Mazumder (2005) even estimates an IGE of 0.6 for the US.
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along the distribution of the father’s earnings with the results from an unconditional 
quantile regression. Doing so changes the perspective of the analysis to the 
outcome of the transmission process by providing estimates of the IGE at different 
percentiles of the son’s earnings distribution.
According to these contributions, my main results are as follows. Based on 
comparable international data for father-son pairs, I find no significant differences 
in the level of intergenerational mobility between Germany and the US. I show that 
the existing low estimates for the IGE in Germany are not robust against variations 
in sampling criteria. Regarding the structure of intergenerational mobility, I find no 
evidence either in Germany or in the US for nonlinearities along the distribution of 
the father’s earnings. When analyzing the relationship along the distribution of the 
son’s earnings, I find that both countries show significant higher intergenerational 
mobility for the sons at the bottom of their earnings distribution. This means that 
ending up at the bottom of the earnings distribution is a severe risk for the sons of 
fathers from all parts of the distribution in both countries.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents 
a theoretical model, and Section 3 describes my empirical strategy. Section 4 
describes the data, Section 5 presents the results and section 6 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical background
As mentioned in the introduction, the most often used measure of intergenerational 
mobility is the IGE (denoted as β in the following), which, in most cases, is 
estimated from a log earnings regression explaining the log earnings of the child 
with log parental earnings and additional controls. In this section, I review a 
simple theoretical model of intergenerational mobility developed by Solon (2004) 
and based on Becker and Tomes (1979,  1986). This model gives a theoretical 
explanation of the IGE. The results of even this simple framework can be used 
to determine cross-country differences and to state a hypothesis predicting the 
result of the comparison between Germany and the US.6
2.2.1 Outline of the model
Assume that family i consists of two generations. For simplicity’s sake, let both 
generations contain one person: one parent (index t  –  1) and one child (index t ). The 
parent’s utility is given as a function of the parent’s own (lifetime-) consumption 
(Ct – 1) and the (lifetime-) earnings of the offspring (Yt ). Following Solon (2004), 
6 There is also a discussion of the model in Black and Devereux (2011).
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I  assume that the utility function is of the Cobb-Douglas type. In the context of this 
model, the Cobb-Douglas parameter α can be interpreted as an altruism parameter 
that compares the relative importance of the parent’s own consumption with the 
offspring’s future earnings:
  (2.1)
In the model, the parent can influence the future earnings of the offspring through 
investments (It – 1) in the child’s human capital (Ht). The parent is not allowed to 
either borrow against the child’s future earnings or to transfer financial assets. The 
parent has to divide his or her own earnings between his or her own consumption 
and investments in the child’s human capital.7 Thus, the parent maximizes his or 
her utility with respect to the following budget constraint:
   (2.2)
where (1 – τ ) Yi, t – 1 is the parent’s available earnings after taxes, and τ is a 
proportional taxation rate.8 The offspring’s human capital formation is a function 
of the monetary investments of the parent and the government (Gt – 1) as well as 
the inherited endowments et that are independent of the monetary investments. 
 (2.3)
The assumption θ  >  0 in conjunction with the semi-log functional form ensures a 
decreasing but positive marginal product of monetary human capital investments.
According to Solon (2004) and Becker and Tomes (1979), et represents different 
non-monetary influence factors. For example, it represents the genetic component 
in the transmission process. In addition it captures the family’s reputation and 
network but also represents the inherited family values, such as attitudes towards 
learning. As it is obvious that these endowments do not depend only on the parent’s 
endowments, but also on former generations, Becker and Tomes (1979) model et in 
a way that it follows a first-order autoregressive process. 
  (2.4)
7 Becker and Tomes (1986) present a model that relaxes this assumption.
8 Note that because of the assumption of proportional taxation, redistributive public policy is included only by 
progressive investments in children’s human capital (see also Solon, 2004).
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where the inheritability coefficient λ is restricted to the interval 0 to 1, and νi, t 
represents a white noise error term.
Solon (2004) characterizes governmental investments by: 
 (2.5)
with ϕ being a constant. In this definition, a positive value of γ ensures that the 
ratio of government investments to after-tax income is decreasing in income. 
Therefore, γ  represents a measure of the progressivity of the government’s spending 
on children. The more positive γ   is, the more progressive the policy.9
Finally, I define the offspring’s earnings as: 
  (2.6)
where μ is a constant and  is the return to human capital.
Utility-maximizing behavior from the parent then leads to the optimal level of 
investments, which is given by: 
 (2.7)
Using this result together with equations (2.3), (2.4), and (2.5), I can reformulate 
equation (2.6) as:10 
  (2.8)
which looks similar to the standard earnings regressions applied to estimate the IGE 
in the literature. However, pei, t is not a proper error term. It is correlated with the 
regressor log Yi, t – 1 because both depend on the parent’s inherited endowment ei, t – 1. 
Solon (2004) shows that in a steady state, the probability limit of the OLS estimator 
of the coefficient of the parent’s log earnings (which is the IGE) in equation (2.8) 
equals:11 
 
 (2.9)
9 Note that this policy is relatively progressive. Although the absolute value of public investments may be higher or 
lower for children from high-earning families, the ratio of public investments to after-tax earnings decreases with 
parental earnings (see also discussion in Solon, 2004).
10
 11 In the framework of this simple model the degree of altruism does not influence the degree of mobility. Higher 
altruism in one society simply leads to higher average earnings for the offspring’s generation.
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2.2.2 Cross-country differences
This result helps clarify the cross-country differences in the estimated IGEs. First, 
intergenerational mobility is higher (= β is lower) if the heritability coefficient λ is 
lower. Second, intergenerational mobility is lower if the efficacy of investments in 
human capital rises (higher θ ). Third, the intergenerational mobility is higher, the 
lower the returns to human capital (ρ ) are. Fourth, the intergenerational mobility 
is higher, the more progressive governmental investments in human capital are 
(higher γ  ).
In the case of Germany and the US, one can now formulate hypotheses based 
on this theoretical model. First, Black and Devereux (2011) argue that the heritability 
coefficient is unlikely to differ significantly between two developed countries. 
Second, the returns to human capital (for example, when measured as education) 
are higher in the US than in Germany (OECD, 2011). Third, because the German 
educational system is free up to the university-level, governmental investments in 
human capital can be seen as more progressive in Germany than in the US.12 The 
remaining influence factor is the efficacy of the educational system. This indicator 
is hard to measure because the definitions of a valid input and output measure of 
the educational system are not clear. Thus, I have to follow Black and Devereux 
(2011) and base my expectations on the remaining three influence factors. Thus, 
given the restriction related to the last factor, based on the theoretical model, one 
should expect Germany to have higher intergenerational mobility than the US.
2.3 Empirical strategy
Equation (2.10) represents the basic regression model that is used in the analysis 
of intergenerational mobility. 
  (2.10)
with β being the estimated IGE. The vector Z contains control variables. In the 
standard case, these variables are polynomials of the father’s age.13 log Yi, t  and 
log Yi, t – 1 are measures of the offspring’s and parent’s log economic status. The 
theoretical model in section 2 suggests using lifetime earnings or lifetime income 
12 In recent years, some of the German Federal States (Bundesländer) have introduced moderate fees to attend 
universities, but the German sample in this study is not affected by this change.
13 Earlier contributions also included the age of the children. However, according to the findings of Haider and Solon 
(2006), the more recent contributions use children’s observations only from a narrow age window. Thus, I do not 
include the children’s age in the regression.
23Chapter 2
Empirical strategy
as the measure of economic status for both generations. Following most of the 
literature, I will use earnings.
As there are no data sets available for the US and Germany that contain the 
lifetime earnings for two generations together with the necessary information 
on family relations, I have to approximate the lifetime earnings by using annual 
earnings observations.
As Solon (1989, 1992) and Zimmerman (1992) point out, the use of annual 
earnings observations instead of the parent’s lifetime earnings in equation (2.10) 
leads to a substantial underestimation of the true intergenerational elasticity 
because annual status is a noisy measure of lifetime status. Annual status introduces 
a measurement error in the model that leads to attenuation bias. Solon (1989, 
1992) proposed using multiyear averages instead and showed that the estimated 
IGE for the US rises from 0.2 to 0.4 if one uses a five-year average of parental 
earnings instead of annual earnings. Mazumder (2005) adds to this discussion and 
suggests using ten- to fifteen-year averages instead of five-year averages.
Haider and Solon (2006) provided another important methodological 
contribution addressing the absence of valid observations of lifetime earnings. The 
authors highlight the potential life-cycle bias arising from a measurement error 
in the dependent variable, which is the log earnings of the child. According to the 
classical errors-in-variables model, measurement error in the child’s earnings would 
only result in higher standard errors for the estimated IGE. The critical assumption 
in this case is that the noise or error component is random over the life cycle.14 
Haider and Solon (2006) showed that the classical errors-in-variables model is not 
appropriate and that the association between current and lifetime earnings varies 
over the life cycle.15
The authors point out that, based on their US data, annual earnings are only 
suited as a proxy for lifetime earnings if these earnings are observed for individuals 
between the ages of 35–42. Earnings observations taken at younger ages lead to a 
substantial underestimation of the IGE. These findings are confirmed by Böhlmark 
and Lindquist (2006) for Sweden and Brenner (2010) for Germany. This argument 
substantially challenges the early IGE estimates on Germany and the US. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the observed children in these samples were young. 
For example, the average age of the sample of oldest sons in the most recent 
contribution (Couch and Lillard, 2004) was 29.22 years in Germany and 28.61 years 
in the US. These averages are much younger than the age range suggested above.
14 A similar discussion can be found in Jenkins (1987), Björklund (1993) and Grawe (2006).
15 Again, taking the long-term averages of the child’s observed annual earnings would at least partly solve this 
problem. However, in contrast to the father’s earnings observations most data sets do not provide enough yearly 
observations on the children to calculate such multi-year averages.
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Estimating equation (2.10) via OLS provides an estimate for the IGE at the mean 
of the father’s and son’s earnings distributions. In a further step, I want to analyze 
whether the structure of intergenerational mobility differs between the two 
countries. Therefore, I must first determine whether equation (2.10) represents the 
appropriate functional form in the association between the parent’s and child’s 
earnings. For example, Bratsberg et al. (2007) showed that the relationship between 
the father’s and son’s earnings is highly nonlinear in the Scandinavian countries. 
However, they did not find evidence for nonlinearities in the UK and the US. I will 
address this question by adding higher polynomials of the father’s earnings to the 
regression equation.
Additionally I estimate equation (2.10) by applying an unconditional quantile 
regression (UQR) approach, which is a method that was recently developed by Firpo 
et al. (2009). In contrast to the standard conditional quantile regression (CQR) 
developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978), UQR estimates provide information on 
the marginal effect of parental earnings at a given percentile of the unconditional 
distribution of the child’s earnings. Thus, this method allows me to determine 
whether the effect of parental earnings differs along the child’s earnings 
distribution.16
2.4 Data
Cross-country comparisons are highly dependent on reliable and comparable data 
sets. For this analysis, I apply data from the SOEP (Wagner et al., 2007) and the 
PSID, both of which are long-running household surveys that are widely used 
in economic and sociological research. Both panels start with an initial set of 
households and track their members over time. Because the individuals are also 
followed when they leave their initial households and form new ones, it is possible 
to observe the children when they leave their parental homes and found their own 
families.
Additionally, both surveys are included in the Cross-National Equivalent File 
(CNEF) project (Frick et al., 2007). This project is conducted at Cornell University 
and provides a subset of the information included in the SOEP and the PSID that 
has already been prepared for international comparisons. I use the information 
on the parent-child relations from the family tables in the original surveys and 
take the outcome variables from the CNEF data sets. For the fathers, I use their 
16 In contrast, the estimates from a CQR represent the effect at the conditional quantile of the child’s earnings 
distribution irrespective of the position of the child in the offspring’s unconditional distribution. Grawe (2004) 
discusses estimating CQR as a test for the existence of credit-constraints in the parent’s generation. For CQR 
estimates see Eide and Showalter (1999) for the US and Schnitzlein (2009) for Germany.
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earnings information from the years 1984–1993 that were taken when the fathers 
were 35–55 years old. Following the suggestions of Solon (1989, 1992), I restrict 
my sample of fathers in both countries to the individuals with at least five valid 
annual earnings observations in the period from 1984–1993. I use an average of 
the earnings observations available in the ten years observed. On average I can use 
8.89 yearly earnings observations for the German fathers and 8.53 yearly earnings 
observations for the US fathers (see Table 2.1). In addition, I add the number of years 
included in the father’s average earnings as control variable in equation (2.10).
A valid annual earnings observation is defined as an earnings observation 
above a certain earnings limit to exclude implausibly low values. In the next 
section, I will show the initial results for three different lower earnings limits.17 
First, I follow the literature and apply an annual earnings limit of 1200 EUR / 1200 
USD. Second, I present the results for an annual earnings limit of 4800 EUR / 4800 
USD and third, I present results based on a sample with a lower earnings limit of 
9600 EUR / 9600 USD.
Following Bratsberg et al. (2007) I restrict my analysis to father-son pairs.18 
The observations of the son’s earnings are taken from the most recent survey 
years. For Germany, this period lasts from 2000–2010. Because the PSID has only 
been biannually performed since 1997 and because the most recent available year 
in the US CNEF data is 2007, the corresponding period is 1999–2007.19 I restrict 
the sample to the individuals with at least 2 valid yearly observations. To avoid 
life-cycle bias, I follow Haider and Solon’s (2006) suggestions and restrict the 
analysis to the sons aged between 35–42 years in the year that their earnings are 
observed. This age range is substantially older than the sample of sons in the prior 
cross-national studies that include Germany. Finally, to prevent the analysis on 
nonlinearities from being driven by outliers, I follow the literature and exclude the 
top and the bottom percent of the distributions of the father’s and son’s average 
earnings.
The resulting sample consists of 352 father-son pairs from 284 different 
families in Germany and 276 father-son pairs from 211 families in the US. The 
main descriptive statistics of this sample are shown in Table 2.1. As can be seen in 
the table, the father’s age is similar in the two samples, and the samples of both 
countries meet the age requirements for the sons suggested by Haider and Solon 
(2006).
17 Earnings are measured in 2005 real values.
18 I do so to prevent the results from being driven by differences in labor market participation.
19 Because of this limitation the US sample contains only five survey years. I did not extent the observation period for 
the US sons to ensure that observations in both countries are taken in the same period.
IAB-Bibliothek 33226
A new look at intergenerational mobility in Germany compared to the US
2.5 Results
2.5.1 The standard model
Table 2.2 contains estimates for the IGE that are comparable to the standard estimates 
in the existing literature. These findings are the result of estimating equation (2.10) 
without including higher-order polynomials of the father’s earnings. I present the 
results for three cases. In the upper panel, all annual earnings observations that are 
higher than 1200 Euro / 1200 USD are included in the calculations of the father’s 
and son’s average earnings. Based on this sample, I estimate the IGE to be 0.262 
in Germany and 0.459 in the US. This finding is in line with the recent results from 
national studies on both countries.20 Based on the point estimate, these results 
indicate that the intergenerational mobility in Germany is higher than that in the 
US. Thus these results are in line with the expectations generated by the theoretical 
model in section 2. According to these estimates, a German son whose father’s 
earnings are 100 percent above the mean in the parent’s generation can expect, on 
average, his own earnings to be 26 percent above the average in his generation.21 
In the US, the same son could expect an earnings advantage of 46 percent. Thus, 
the regression to the mean is stronger in Germany than in the US. However, the 
difference between the countries fails to be statistically significant.
Additionally, one may ask how robust this finding is. The second panel in 
Table  2.2 contains the estimates for the IGE based on a sample for which the lower 
earnings limit is varied. Increasing the lower earnings limit to 4800 EUR / 4800 USD 
leaves the IGE estimate for the US unaffected but increases the IGE for Germany 
up to 0.332. Thus, the gap between the two estimates is reduced. In the third panel, 
the estimates are based on a sample that only included the earnings observations 
above 9600 EUR / 9600 USD. Again, the US estimate remains stable, but the German 
estimate further increases to 0.417.
So, I can reproduce the standard result from the prior literature, which states that 
the German IGE estimates are lower than the US ones. However, even a reasonable 
degree of variation in the sampling rules leads to similar estimates in both countries. 
The differences in the reaction of the estimated IGE to a variation in the lower 
earnings limit highlight the need for a cross-country comparison. Based on these 
results there is no evidence for a significant difference between the two countries.
One may now ask which earnings limit to choose. A lower earnings limit of 
1200 EUR / 1200 USD is very low in an analysis including Germany. In Germany 
20 See Schnitzlein (2009) for an overview on the results for Germany and Corak (2006) for an overview on the US 
results.
21 Note that this finding is a correlation, not a causal effect.
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individuals whose earnings are around 100 EUR per month will receive social benefits 
or unemployment benefits in most cases. As an analysis of the intergenerational 
transmission of welfare benefits is not within the scope of this chapter (for results 
on this topic see for example, Baron et al., 2008; Pepper, 2000) I chose a higher 
earnings threshold. However, an earnings limit of 9600 EUR / 9600 USD is very 
restrictive as monthly earnings of 800 EUR or 800 USD are not unreasonably low. 
Therefore, I decided to apply the medium lower threshold to the further analysis.
2.5.2 Structure of the intergenerational mobility
To analyze the structure of the intergenerational relationship I present a graphical 
representation of the data. Figure 2.1 depicts the data of the two countries. The 
figure provides the average of the son’s log earnings by the father’s earnings 
percentile together with a linear regression through these data points. The upper 
part of the figure represents the German data, and the lower part represents the 
US data.
In both countries there is no evidence for nonlinearities along the distribution 
of the father’s earnings. This finding is in line with the result of Bratsberg et al. 
(2007) who, based on NLSY data, also present a graphical representation of the 
intergenerational transmission process in the US and who also found no evidence 
for a nonlinear relationship.
Thus, the first examination of the data did not provide evidence on 
nonlinearities in either country. This finding is supported by the results of a RESET 
test that I performed on the model in equation (2.10). In both countries, the test 
fails to reject the null hypothesis. Nevertheless I reestimated equation (2.10) 
for both countries including the second- and third-order polynomials of the the 
father’s log earnings. The results of these estimations are presented in Table 2.3. All 
of the cases including the higher-order polynomials lead to insignificant coefficient 
estimates for the father’s log earnings variables. A joint F-test for the significance 
of the higher-order polynomials also fails to reject the null hypothesis in both 
countries. In sum there is no evidence that the IGE differs along the distributions of 
the father’s earnings in both countries.
Adding the polynomials of the father’s earnings to the standard earnings 
equation answers the question of whether intergenerational mobility is higher or 
lower for the children of parents with higher incomes. Another important but less 
analyzed question is whether there are differences with respect to the distribution 
of the son’s earnings. The focus on the distribution of the children’s earnings 
changes the perspective of the analysis. Whereas parental earnings are the origin 
of the transmission process, the offspring’s earnings are the outcome.
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To assess this question, I apply a UQR approach to equation (2.10). The results are 
shown in Table 2.4, which presents the OLS estimate as well as the UQR estimates 
at the 20th, the 40th, the 60th and the 80th percentile of the son’s earnings.
The table shows that in both countries mobility is significantly higher at the 
bottom quintile than at the top quintile. In Germany for low-earning sons, the 
estimated IGE is 0.102 and is not statistically different from 0. Hence, there is 
virtually no association between the father’s earnings and the son’s own earnings 
in this part of the son’s earnings distribution. The estimate at the 20th percentile 
is also the lowest in the US. In contrast to the German estimate, the US estimate is 
significantly different from 0. In both countries the estimate at the 20th percentile 
is significantly lower than the estimate at the 80th percentile. Thus, Table 2.4 
indicates that the intergenerational mobility in both countries is higher for the 
low-earning sons than the high-earning sons.
However, in an analysis along the distribution of the father’s earnings this 
finding would be positive. Higher intergenerational mobility for sons whose father’s 
are at the bottom of the earnings distribution would indicate that the sons can 
improve their position. In contrast, the finding in this analysis indicates higher 
mobility for sons at the bottom of their distribution of earnings. As the son’s 
earnings are the outcome of the intergenerational transmission process, that result 
means that ending up at the bottom of the distribution of son’s earnings is a severe 
risk for sons with fathers from all parts of the distribution.
The results in Table 2.4 further show, that the remaining structure is 
different. The 20th percentile estimate is a clear outlier among the German 
results. The remaining estimates all range from 0.5 to 0.6, which suggests that the 
intergenerational mobility is low. These results suggest that the low OLS estimate 
for Germany might be driven by high mobility at the lower end of the son’s earnings 
distribution. In contrast to Germany, the IGE estimates increase with the son’s 
earnings in the US up to an estimate of 0.767 at the 80th percentile. This finding 
also shows a low level of intergenerational mobility in the US. However, even if the 
structure of the intergenerational mobility differs between the US and Germany 
both countries show a low level of mobility.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I present estimates of intergenerational mobility in Germany and the 
United States based on recent comparable data sets. Although the point estimate 
for the IGE derived from the standard estimation indicates that intergenerational 
mobility is higher in Germany, this difference fails to be significant and appears 
not to be robust against variation in sampling criteria. I find no evidence for 
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nonlinearities along the father’s earnings distribution. In contrast, I find that 
intergenerational mobility is higher for the sons at the lowest quintile of the 
son’s earnings distribution in both countries. Thus ending up at the bottom of the 
earnings distribution is an actual risk for the sons of fathers from all parts of their 
earnings distribution.
Based on these results I conclude that although the two countries may differ 
in their structures of intergenerational mobility, there is no clear evidence of one 
being more mobile than the other. In particular, the UQR estimates show high 
intergenerational persistence in both countries.
2.7 Figures and tables
Figure 2.1: The relationship between the father’s and son’s earnings in Germany and the US
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Note:  the figure contains the regression line and mean log earnings of sons and fathers for each percentile of father’s 
earnings distribution. The upper part presents German data and the lower part presents data from the US.
Source: SOEP (1984–2010), PSID (1984–2007).
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Germany US
Median / Mean Median / Mean
son’s earnings 53,803.65 50,467.08
father’s earnings 45,165.29 53,617.57
number of years in average 8.89 8.53
father’s age 47.66 48.05
son’s age 37.77 38.20
sample size 352 276
number of families 284 211
Note:  the table contains descriptive statistics of the sample used in the analysis. The table presents the median of the 
earnings and the mean for all of the other variables. The applied lower earnings limit is 4800 EUR / 4800 USD. 
For better comparability earnings are given in USD using the following exchange rate: 1 EUR = 1.3992 USD.
Source: SOEP (1984–2010), PSID (1984–2007). 
Table 2.2: Estimated intergenerational elasticities
 Germany US  
lower earnings limit 1200 EUR / 1200 USD 
IGE 0.262 *** 0.459 *** 
se 0.096  0.070  
N 357  278  
lower earnings limit 4800 EUR / 4800 USD 
IGE 0.332 *** 0.454 *** 
se 0.088  0.068  
N 352  276  
lower earnings limit 9600 EUR / 9600 USD 
IGE 0.417 *** 0.482 *** 
se 0.074  0.070  
N 295  262  
Note:  the table contains estimates of intergenerational elasticities. The figures in italics are standard  
errors clustered at family level. ***: significance at 1 percent level, **: significance at 5 percent level,  
*: significance at 10 percent level.
Source: SOEP (1984–2010), PSID (1984–2007). 
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Table 2.3: Estimated intergenerational elasticities – different functional forms
Germany US
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
ln (father’s earnings) 0.332 *** 1.853 35.026 0.454 *** –2.364 –51.634
se 0.088 3.601 119.553 0.068 2.122 44.595
ln (father’s earnings)2 –0.072 –3.226 0.130 4.671
se 0.172 11.394 0.099 4.106
ln (father’s earnings)3 0.100 –0.139
se 0.362 0.126
N 352 352 352 276 276 276
adj.-R 2 0.062 0.06 0.057 0.157 0.159 0.159
p-value RESET test 0.217 – – 0.528 – –
p-value joint F-test – 0.674 0.857 – 0.190 0.219
Note:  the table contains estimates of intergenerational elasticities. The figures in italics are standard  
errors clustered at family level. ***: significance at 1 percent level, **: significance at 5 percent level,  
*: significance at 10 percent level.
Source: SOEP (1984–2010), PSID (1984–2007). 
 
Table 2.4:  Estimated intergenerational elasticities – results from unconditional quantile  
regressions
Germany US
OLS 0.332 *** 0.454 ***
se 0.088 0.068
N 352 276
results from UQR:
20th percentile 0.102 0.239 **
se 0.112 0.093
40th percentile 0.518 *** 0.383 ***
se 0.093 0.072
60th percentile 0.562 *** 0.494 ***
se 0.080 0.078
80th percentile 0.506 *** 0.767 ***
se 0.115 0.104
Note:  the table contains estimates of intergenerational elasticities based on unconditional quantile regressions.  
***: significance at 1 percent level, **: significance at 5 percent level, *: significance at 10 percent level.
Source: SOEP (1984–2010), PSID (1984–2007). 
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3  How important is the family? Evidence from  
sibling correlations in permanent earnings in the US, 
Germany, and Denmark
Daniel D. Schnitzlein
3.1 Introduction
The last three decades witnessed a substantial growth of the economic 
literature on intergenerational mobility with results covering a large number 
of countries.22 The studies addressed numerous questions, starting with simple 
linear estimates of the intergenerational association of earnings and ending 
up in international comparisons of non-linearities in the intergenerational 
transmission of labor market success. Most of these studies focus on the 
calculation of intergenerational earnings elasticities (hereafter IGEs) which 
measure the association between parental income and the economic success 
of the offspring. Intergenerational mobility in this sense answers the question: 
“How strong is the relationship between parental income and the income of the 
offspring in adulthood?”
The main reason why research on intergenerational mobility gets attention in 
the literature is that the degree of intergenerational mobility in a society is often 
seen as a key indicator of equality of opportunities. Having this interpretation in 
mind, it might not be enough to analyze the association between the earnings 
or the income of parents and children. The relevant question to ask would rather 
be: “How dependent or independent is the economic outcome of children of the 
situation of the family they were born into?”
Of course this includes much more than only parental income but all family 
factors23 and community factors24 that children face. While parental income might 
be an important factor it is not obvious that it should be the only, or the major 
influence factor. Recent research on intergenerational mobility based on sibling 
correlations has shown that parental income and factors correlated with it explain 
less than half of the total impact of family and community factors on children’s 
economic outcome in adulthood (Björklund et al., 2010; Mazumder, 2008). Thus, it 
is necessary to calculate a broader measure of the influence of family background 
22 See Solon (1999), Black and Devereux (2011), and Björklund and Jäntti (2009) for an extensive overview of the 
literature on intergenerational mobility.
23 Beside parental income these can be for example parental education, parent’s social network but also parental 
attitudes and parenting style.
24 Two examples would be the neighborhood and the quality of the available schools.
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than an IGE to draw firm conclusions with respect to the degree of intergenerational 
mobility as an indicator of equality of opportunities in a specific country.
Sibling correlations provide such a broader measure: if family and community 
factors have a significant impact on the outcome of children, two siblings should 
resemble each other more than two randomly drawn individuals (Solon, 1999). While 
calculating sibling correlations is a well known method in sociological research it 
is so far a rarely used approach in the economic literature on intergenerational 
mobility.25
One way to evaluate the level of intergenerational mobility as an indicator of 
equality of opportunities, is to compare the situation in different countries. The three 
countries considered in this chapter represent different types of modern welfare 
states with different institutional settings. We know from the existing literature on 
sibling correlations as well as intergenerational correlations, that intergenerational 
mobility is higher in the Scandinavian countries than it is in the US (Björklund 
et al., 2002; Corak, 2006). The evidence about the ranking of Germany remained 
unclear in the literature. Here this chapter contributes in three ways.
First, it provides estimates of sibling correlations for Denmark, the US, 
and Germany based on comparable samples. As there are no results on sibling 
correlations in permanent earnings for Germany so far, this chapter fills a gap 
in the literature. Second, it updates the US-Denmark comparison carried out by 
Björklund et al. (2002) based on recent data and an alternative estimation strategy. 
Third, it provides evidence on where to rank Germany in terms of intergenerational 
mobility in international comparison. Additionally, I present extensive robustness 
checks for the results using different sample selection rules. All estimations are 
carried out for both, brothers and sisters.
To summarize the main findings: the importance of family and community 
background in Germany is higher than in Denmark and comparable to that in the 
US. This holds true for brothers and sisters. In Denmark 20 percent of the inequality 
in permanent earnings can be attributed to family and community factors shared 
by brothers while the corresponding estimates are 43 percent in Germany and 45 
percent in the US. For sisters the estimates are 19 percent for Denmark, 39 percent 
for Germany and 29 percent for the US. The developed ranking appears to be robust 
to most of the variations in sample selection rules.
25 In contrast to the economic literature the sociological literature on sibling correlations or sibling resemblance 
mainly focused on educational outcomes or prestige score measures. See for example Hauser and Wong (1989) for 
the US and Sieben et al. (2001) for Germany.
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3.2 Literature review
3.2.1 Literature on sibling correlations
Table 3.1 summarizes the existing results on sibling correlations in permanent 
earnings by country.26 It shows that, with one exception for China, until now, the 
literature focused on the US and the Scandinavian countries.27
One of the earliest studies is Solon et al. (1991) who use Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) data for the US.28 The authors pointed out that it is important to 
separate transitory fluctuations from the earnings measure. Their results showed 
that intergenerational mobility measured by sibling correlations in permanent 
economic outcomes is much lower in the US than what was known from previous 
studies based on short run measures.29 They found the brother correlation in 
earnings to be 0.34–0.45, depending on which assumptions they impose on their 
model.
These results are updated by Mazumder (2008): using the PSID and the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) he found the brother correlations in earnings 
to be 0.49 (NLSY) and 0.39 (PSID). He also presents estimates of the contribution of 
specific factors explaining sibling correlation, for example, he shows that only 36 
percent of the brother correlation in earnings can be explained by parental income 
measures. Human capital factors and occupation each are able to explain about 
half the sibling correlation.
A much more detailed study on the question which factors determine sibling 
correlations is Björklund et al. (2010) based on Swedish data. Besides parental 
income, human capital, and occupation they found that measures of parental 
behavior (indicators like parental involvement in schoolwork, parenting practices 
and maternal attitudes) have substantial explanatory power.
In another study using Swedish data, Björklund et al. (2009) show that 
intergenerational mobility rose remarkably in Sweden during the rise of the welfare 
state. They found brother correlations of about 0.49 for cohorts born in the 1930s and 
26 Most authors focus on brother pairs and sister pairs. Given the differences in the attachment to the labor market 
between brothers and sisters, allowing for mixed sibling pairs would lead to estimates that highly depend on how 
many brother-sister pairs are observed in each family.
27 Comi (2010) calculates sibling correlations in early career earnings for seven European countries including Germany. 
The results are not listed in Table 3.1 as they have an explicit focus on early career outcomes. So these estimates 
cannot be seen as a proxy for intergenerational mobility. Schnitzlein (2011) presents brother correlations in 
permanent earnings for different ethnic groups in Denmark. As the results in Table 3.1 do not distinguish between 
ethnic groups, these results are also not included. 
28 There were some studies published before the Solon et al. (1991) article, but as they suffer from various sources of 
bias as described in Solon et al. (1991) I did not include them in Table 3.1. See Solon (1999) for a survey.
29 This is very similar to the findings in Solon (1989) and Solon (1992) for intergenerational correlations.
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brother correlations of about 0.32 for cohorts born in the 1950s, slightly increasing 
back to 0.37 for cohorts born in the 1960s. The authors show that factors related 
to schooling can account for a large part of this rise in intergenerational mobility; 
however, they cannot identify which factors were the important determinants after 
eliminating changes in returns to schooling and changes in the brother correlations 
in schooling. In their conclusion the authors suggest that this rise in mobility is 
most likely driven by school reforms.
In the most recent contribution Eriksson and Zhang (2010) used Chinese data 
and conclude, that intergenerational mobility is very low in China even compared 
to the US. They also analyzed if there were differences between coastal and interior 
provinces, but they found a very similar level of intergenerational mobility in both 
types of regions.
3.2.2 Cross-country comparisons
There, so far are only two studies providing results on cross-country comparisons 
of sibling correlations in permanent earnings. Björklund et al. (2002) compared the 
US to Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway. They focused on brother correlations 
and concluded that the influence of family background is much less important 
in the Scandinavian countries than in the US. Björklund et al. (2004) extended 
the results for Finland, Sweden, and Norway to sisters and found the same cross-
national pattern but lower overall correlations for sisters.
These findings for sibling correlations are in line with those on intergenerational 
mobility based on IGEs, which result in the following widely accepted stylized fact:30 
the US mark the lower end of the mobility scale in international comparisons of 
industrialized countries, and the Scandinavian countries face the lowest influence 
of parental economic status on the labor market success of their offspring.
The evidence for Germany is less clear. As there are no previous results on 
sibling correlations, all prior comparisons are based on IGEs. Couch and Dunn 
(1997) carried out the first comparison of intergenerational mobility between 
Germany and the US. They used data from the PSID and the German Socio-
economic Panel (SOEP) to estimate IGEs for both countries. Their German sample 
of sons and daughters was very young due to the short duration of the SOEP at 
the time. When constructing a US sample that was comparable in age to their 
German data, they found no significant differences between the two countries. 
Haider and Solon (2006) however point out that observing offspring at very young 
ages could lead to serious bias in the estimation of the IGE, so that the results of 
30 See for example Corak (2006).
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Couch and Dunn (1997) could be biased. This skepticism is supported by recent 
estimates of IGEs for Germany that are much lower than the consensus estimate 
for the US, indicating higher intergenerational mobility in Germany than in the 
US (Eisenhauer and Pfeiffer, 2008; Schnitzlein, 2009; Yuksel, 2009). But as these 
studies only provided national analyses it remains unclear how comparable the 
results are to the US estimates.
3.3 Statistical model and empirical strategy
The following statistical model is based on Solon et al. (1991) and Solon (1999). 
Let yij be a measure of permanent or long-run earnings for child j of family i . Next 
assume that the interaction of family background (including community effects) 
and individual effects can be characterized such that permanent earnings can be 
decomposed into the sum of two orthogonal components, a family component αi 
and an individual component μij  .
  (3.1)
The family component in this framework represents the combined effect of all 
factors that are shared by siblings from family i . The individual component covers 
all factors that are purely idiosyncratic to sibling j. Assuming orthogonality of αi  
and μij  , the variance of permanent earnings σ 2y  can be expressed as the sum of the 
variances of the family component αi  and the individual component μij :
  (3.2)
As in the present case, the measure of interest is the correlation coefficient between 
the permanent earnings of two siblings one needs an expression for the covariance 
between the permanent earnings of two siblings j and j ′ of the same family i. This 
covariance can be shown to be 
     (3.3)
which equals the variance of the family component. With this information the 
correlation coefficient ρ of the permanent earnings of two siblings j and j ′ equals 
the ratio of the variance of the family component σ 2
α
  and the variance of the 
complete permanent earnings σ 2
α
 +  σ 2μ :
IAB-Bibliothek 33240
How important is the family? Evidence from sibling correlations in permanent earnings
 (3.4)
The intuitive interpretation of this ratio is, that the correlation in permanent 
earnings between two siblings (therefore sibling correlation) equals the proportion 
of the variance of permanent earnings that can be attributed to factors shared by 
siblings. If variance is interpreted as a measure of inequality, the sibling correlation 
denotes the share of inequality in a permanent outcome that can be attributed to 
factors shared by siblings.
As σ 2
α
 and σ 2μ cannot be negative, ρ takes on values between 0 and 1. Linking 
this measure to the question of intergenerational mobility, a correlation of 0 
indicates that there is no influence from family and community factors and 1 
indicates that there is no influence from the individual. The first case would 
describe a fully mobile society and the latter a fully deterministic one.
An important issue in the analysis of intergenerational mobility is the choice 
of an outcome measure. One obvious choice could be annual earnings. However, 
annual earnings contain not only information on the economic outcome of an 
individual but also contain a transitory part that reflects temporary fluctuations. In 
the sense of the research question stated above “How dependent or independent 
is the economic outcome of the children of the situation of the family they were 
born into?” transitory fluctuations are of minor interest. The important outcome 
is the permanent or long-run component of earnings. Thus, the empirical strategy 
has to separate the transitory from the permanent component of annual earnings.
In the context of sibling correlations this was first addressed by Solon et al. 
(1991).31 They showed that not controlling for transitory fluctuations when using 
annual earnings leads to serious underestimation of sibling correlations. The authors 
found an attenuation factor above 0.55 for their US data. This suggests that not 
taking into account the difference between permanent and annual earnings might 
lead to estimates for the sibling correlation of only half of the correct size.
The sibling correlation described above can be estimated as the within-cluster 
correlation in the following linear multilevel model,
  (3.5)
with yijt being an annual earnings observation, Xijt being a matrix of fixed year and 
age effects (including year dummies and polynomials of age) and the remaining 
three parts being the family, individual and transitory components. In this model 
(αi + μij  ) can be interpreted as permanent income. Following Mazumder (2008) 
31 See Solon (1992) for a discussion of the same issue in the case of IGEs.
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I apply Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML) to estimate this model and to 
calculate the variances of αi and μij . In the results section I will report the variance 
components along with the sibling correlation. The standard error for the sibling 
correlation is calculated using the delta method.32
3.4 Data and sampling rules
3.4.1 Data
For the US and Germany I use data from the SOEP (Wagner et al., 2007) and the 
PSID. Both are nationally representative household surveys widely used in economic 
and sociological research. Both datasets started with a set of households that were 
asked on an annual basis (in the case of the PSID the households are interviewed 
biannually after 1997). As the children of these original households grew up and 
founded own families, their households were interviewed as new survey households. 
This feature enables me to link siblings when they are grown up. A strength of 
the SOEP and the PSID, in addition to the vast amount of information available 
in the data, is, that both surveys are included in the Cross-National-Equivalent-
File (CNEF) project carried out at Cornell University. It contains internationally 
comparable variables for a subset of the information in the original surveys.33
I extract family relations information from the original surveys and use the 
information on annual labor earnings as provided in the CNEF data. I use the most 
recent waves available, covering the years 2002–2008 for Germany and the years 
1999, 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007 for the US.
For Denmark I had access to data from the Danish Integrated Database for 
Labor Market Research (Integreret Database for Arbejdsmarkedsforskning (IDA)) 
which is a database that combines information from various administrative registers 
collected by the Danish government and administered by Statistics Denmark.34 Being 
administrative data the IDA database has some desirable properties. First, it covers 
32 There is a discussion in the literature on whether the model should be estimated allowing for serial correlation 
of the transitory individual component. As, especially in the survey data, gaps of different lengths in the series 
of yearly earnings observations are common, I did not incorporate a serial correlations model. If serial correlation 
would be a problem the presented correlations in this chapter would be downward biased. Björklund et al. (2002) 
showed that accounting for autocorrelated errors in the Danish data only slightly changed the brother correlation 
from 0.25 to 0.29. Mazumder (2008) argued that estimating the model allowing for serial correlation has no 
effect on his estimates for the US. Nevertheless if there would be a problem with serial correlation, the corrected 
German estimate would be even higher than the one presented in this chapter. This would leave the main findings 
unaffected.
33 See http://www.human.cornell.edu / pam / research / centers-programs / german-panel / cnef.cfm for an overview on 
the available data and Frick et al. (2007) for additional information.
34 Unfortunately there is no English documentation available. Nevertheless an English description of the database 
can be found in Timmermans (2010) and http://www.asb.dk / article.aspx? pid=675. A complete list of variables, in 
Danish, can be found in Danmarks Statistik (1998).
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the entire Danish population so there is no sample selection or panel attrition. 
Second, the earnings information should be more precise when coming from 
administrative data sources then from interviews. Third, another major advantage of 
this data is the high number of individuals (all Danish residents) covered.
As it would be computationally very burdensome to use the entire Danish 
population for the analysis I had to draw a sample comparable to the ones from 
Germany and the US. A natural choice would be to draw a random sample of the 
Danish population. But this would be different from what is given in the surveys 
for Germany and the US.
In the two surveys the initial unit is the parental household and not the 
offspring that is observed in this study. To take this into account, I choose to first 
define a family indicator for every individual covered in the years 2002–2006. As it 
is important how to define which siblings belong to one family, I will provide results 
for four different alternatives and will verify that the results are robust to these 
definitions. In the main scenario I define two individuals to belong to one family, 
and thus to be considered siblings, if the data contains the same mother and the 
same father identification number.35 Then I draw a 10 percent random sample of 
these families. In the second step I include all children from the sampled families in 
the analysis and use the annual labor earnings variable available in the IDA dataset.
3.4.2 Sampling rules
As for example Björklund et al. (2002) pointed out, the results of a sibling correlation 
analysis are sensitive to the applied sample selection rules. In the following I will 
describe the sample selection rules for what I call the main scenario. The results 
based on these specifications are the results that are most comparable to the 
existing literature. I will present robustness checks that show how sensitive the 
main findings are to these sampling decisions.
In the main scenario the earnings observations of siblings between age 31 and 
49 are considered. So in every country even the high educated have entered the 
labor market and should still be in the labor force. Below I will also show results for 
a shorter age window (36–49).
I impose a lower annual earnings limit of 1200 Euro (9000 DKK, 1200 USD) in 
real 2007 values. I also consider three alternative cases, a lower earnings limit of 
600 Euro (4500 DKK, 600 USD) and a case with no lower earnings limit.
Table 3.2 contains descriptive statistics for both brothers and sisters for the 
main sample scenario. The first column in each part of the table contains the 
35 Note that this does not have to be identical with being biological siblings.
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number of individuals observed in each year.36 These are clearly higher in the Danish 
administrative data compared to the household surveys from Germany and the US. 
This explains that the results in the next section are estimated more precisely for 
the Danish sample. The table further contains median earnings and mean age for 
brothers and sisters in the three countries.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Results for the main scenario 
Starting with the main scenario, the estimation results for brothers and sisters are 
shown in Table 3.3. In the first three rows the estimated variance components σ 2
α
 , 
σ 2μ , and σ 
2
υ
 are shown along with their standard errors. As all figures in the table 
are at least statistically significant at the five percent level the significance is not 
explicitly marked. The estimated sibling correlations ρ are presented in the bold 
typed line of Table 3.3.
For brothers the estimated correlation in permanent earnings is 0.20 in 
Denmark, 0.43 in Germany and 0.45 in the US. According to these results family 
and community background is of about the same importance in Germany and the 
US and is much less important in Denmark. Thus, in Denmark, around 20 percent of 
the inequality in permanent earnings can be attributed to factors shared by siblings. 
The corresponding figures are 43 percent for Germany and 45 percent for the US.
Comparing the 95 percent confidence intervals it becomes clear that there 
is a significant difference between Germany and Denmark and between the 
US and Denmark. The intervals of the German and the US estimates however 
overlap. Given the argumentation above that sibling correlations are a measure of 
intergenerational mobility, this leads to the first results:
 s For brothers there is significantly less intergenerational mobility in Germany 
and the US than in Denmark. 
 s For brothers there is no significant difference in intergenerational mobility 
between Germany and the US. 
The situation is not as clear-cut for sisters as for brothers. The estimated 
correlations are 0.19 for Denmark, 0.39 for Germany and 0.29 for the US, meaning 
that 19 (39 / 29) percent of the inequality in permanent earnings can be attributed 
to factors shared by sisters in Denmark (Germany / US).
36 These numbers include siblings as well as singletons. In the estimation I follow the existing literature and estimate 
the model including singletons. For a discussion see Solon et al. (1991) and Mazumder (2008).
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The estimates are in line with prior results, i.e. that sister correlations are lower than 
the corresponding brother correlations. Due to the lower number of observations 
available, especially in the German data, the estimates are less precise compared to 
the estimates for brother pairs. As a result, the 95 percent confidence intervals for 
the three countries are overlapping, even with the Danish point estimate being only 
half of the size of the German one. However the differences between Germany and 
the US on one side and Denmark on the other side are statistically significant at 
the 10 percent level, indicating that there is a difference between the importance 
of family background for sisters in Denmark compared to the two other countries. 
Thus, the summary for sisters resembles that for brothers:
 s For sisters there is significantly less intergenerational mobility in Germany and 
the US than in Denmark. 
 s  For sisters there is no significant difference in intergenerational mobility 
between Germany and the US. 
3.5.2 Discussion of the results
The results show that there is a higher level of intergenerational mobility in Denmark 
compared to Germany and the US. As it is beyond the scope of this chapter to identify 
causal mechanisms in the determination of the level of intergenerational mobility I 
want to offer a short discussion of the potential reasons for the observed differences. 
The first question that has to be addressed is: are the observed differences due to 
differences in the cultural background of the individuals in the three countries or 
due to differences in the institutional settings. As I cannot test this within a cross-
country comparison, because cultural background and institutional setting jointly 
vary between the three countries, recent results from the literature show that cultural 
background might not be a major determinant for the level of intergenerational 
mobility. First, Björklund et al. (2009) show that the rise of the Swedish welfare state, 
which can be interpreted as a variation of the institutional framework controlling for 
cultural background, was accompanied by a clear rise in intergenerational mobility 
over time. Second, in Schnitzlein (2011) I find no differences in brother correlations 
among different groups of second generation immigrants in Denmark. These results 
indicate that instead of cultural background the institutional setting plays a major 
role in the determination of the level of intergenerational mobility.
Given these results from the literature, together with the results from the cross-
country comparisons in Björklund et al. (2002) and this recent chapter, that show 
that there are significant differences between the countries under study, future 
research should try to identify the role of specific institutions in the determination 
of the level of intergenerational mobility.
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3.6 Robustness of the results
Björklund et al. (2002) show that the estimates for sibling correlations are to some 
extent sensitive to variations in the applied sample selection rules. The aim of this 
section is to analyze how robust the main findings stated above are to changes in 
the main sample dimensions.
First, I vary the definition of a sibling. Second, I modify the lower earnings 
limit holding fixed the age at which I observe the siblings. Third, I vary the age and 
hold the earnings limit fixed. The results of these robustness checks can be found 
in Tables 3.4–3.9. Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 present estimated sibling correlations 
for 20 different sample specifications in each country.37 Finally, Tables 3.7, 3.8 and 
3.9 give an overview over which cross-country comparisons result in a significant 
difference and at which level.
The structure of the tables is oriented at the three factors mentioned above. Each 
column contains another definition of who is counted as a sibling: alternative 1 is the 
definition of the main scenario, where two individuals are counted as siblings if they 
report the same mother and father. Alternative 2 relaxes this to the case that two 
individuals are counted as siblings if they report the same father and in the case the 
information on the father is missing they are matched if they report the same mother. 
Alternative 3 counts two individuals as siblings only based on the information on the 
mother and Alternative 4 incorporates only the information on the father.
In the first panel of the tables the age window is hold constant (31–49 years 
of age) and I vary the lower earnings limit. I calculate the sibling correlations for 
three scenarios. The first row contains the earnings definition of the main scenario 
in which low earnings are cut at 9000 DKK, 1200 EUR and 1200 USD. In the second 
row, I relax the lower limit to half of the main scenario and in the last row of this 
block all results are calculated using no lower earnings limit.38
The second panel holds the earnings limit fixed at the definition of the main 
scenario and varies the age restriction. The first row presents results for siblings 
observed at younger ages (26–44 years) and the second row for siblings observed 
between 36 and 49 years of age.
3.6.1 Results of the robustness checks
I start the discussion with the different definitions of siblings. While every column 
of Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 contains another sibling definition, the sibling correlations 
37 Tables 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12 contain the associated number of observations, individuals, and families.
38 Only missing observations and those with zero earnings (because of the calculation of log earnings) are excluded.
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in all three countries do not vary much along this dimension. Thus, the estimates 
seem to be robust for both, brothers and sisters.
The modification of the lower earnings limit seems to be more influential. One 
important source of bias in the early studies on intergenerational mobility based 
on sibling correlations was that they relied on too homogeneous samples (see the 
discussion in Solon et al., 1991). One could expect a similar effect here. The higher 
the annual earnings limit, the more homogeneous the sample gets with respect 
to permanent earnings. This reduces the overall variance. The total effect on the 
sibling correlation is unclear, because it is not obvious which part of the overall 
variance, the family specific part or the individual part or both will be depressed. 
The results in the first two rows of the upper panels of Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 show 
that reducing the annual earnings limit to half of the size in the main scenario 
has little effect on the estimated correlations. For German sisters, this is also 
true for dropping the annual earnings limit. While the estimates for US brothers 
show a slight increase, for all other groups waiving the earnings restriction comes 
along with a clear decrease in the estimated sibling correlation. In these groups 
dropping the annual earnings limit increases the within family variance (variance 
of the individual specific component) by a higher amount than the between family 
variance (variance of the family specific component).
These different reactions to a change in the sampling rules highlight the need 
for a cross-country comparison. They show that it might be misleading to draw 
conclusions solely based on national studies when it is not possible to vary the 
sample restrictions of all countries involved. As the impact of these variations may 
differ between the countries, one needs to know the magnitude of the change to 
examine whether the main results are affected.
The lower panels in Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 hold the earnings limit fixed at 
the definition of the main scenario and vary the age at which the individuals were 
observed. The first row in the lower panels contains an estimate based on a younger 
cohort (26–44 years of age) and the second an estimate based on an older cohort 
(36–49 years of age).
One would expect the more narrow age window (between 36–49 years) to 
yield a more homogeneous sample. Again the overall effect is not clear. On the 
one hand reducing the age difference should reduce the variance within a family 
as the brothers and sisters are observed at more similar ages. But the same is true 
for the variance between families. The results show that narrowing the age window 
has little effect on the estimates. There is only one clear exception, the estimated 
correlations for German brothers clearly increase when the age window is restricted 
to the age between 36–49 years. This means that the change in the age window 
did reduce the within family variation to a larger extent than the variance between 
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families. This can either be due to the fact that now observations are taken at more 
similar ages or that siblings with too large age differences do not enter the sample in 
this specification. As it is the aim of this chapter to present results of a cross-country 
comparison I interpret this differing reaction as another evidence that international 
rankings should be based on cross-country comparisons instead of national studies.
Another example is the response of the estimates for German brothers and 
sisters compared to US brothers to a change in the age restriction towards a 
younger age group (26–44 years of age). While the estimates for brothers in the 
US rise in magnitude, the German estimates decrease. One possible explanation 
for this behavior would be that in Germany especially highly educated individuals 
enter the labor market at older ages. In the first years there is not yet a big 
difference between high and low earners. If there are families with mainly low 
earning members and families with mainly high earning members this would lead 
to a decrease in the estimated correlation.
The majority of the mentioned differences resulting from variations in the 
sampling dimensions are not statistically significant as parts of their confidence 
bands overlap. But especially when the response of the correlations due to a change 
in sample selection rules is different in two countries it is important to see whether 
the results stated in section 5 are still correct.
3.6.2 Robustness of the main scenario results
The results stated in section 5 refer to the cross-national comparison of the 
sibling correlations. In the following I discuss how robust these findings are to the 
described variations in sample selection criteria. Tables 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 show which 
pairwise confidence intervals are not overlapping for the different specifications. 
Two stars denote non-overlapping 95 percent confidence intervals and one star 
denotes non-overlapping 90 percent confidence intervals.
In Table 3.7 one can find the Denmark-US comparison. As all calculated 
specifications for brothers show differences at the 5 percent level, the difference 
between Denmark and the US is a robust result. This updates and confirms the 
results by Björklund et al. (2002) and is in line with the results based on IGE / IGCs.
Table 3.8 shows the position of Germany compared to Denmark. For brothers, 
the differences between Denmark and Germany are statistically significant for 
all specifications except for the younger cohort. Even though the point estimates 
are all higher in Germany, the differences for this cohort are not statistically 
significant. This is because the correlations respond differently to a change in the 
age restriction in Germany and Denmark. Given this exception the result of higher 
intergenerational mobility in Denmark is a robust finding.
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For sisters the picture is less clear. In the Denmark-US comparison (Table 3.7) most 
of the specifications except the one without lower earnings limit are significantly 
different at least at the ten percent level. In the Germany-Denmark comparison 
(Table 3.8) this is only true for less than half of the specifications. However, given 
the low number of observations especially in the German sample and as most of the 
specifications in the main age window show significant differences, I still interpret 
this as support for the results in section 5.
The comparison between Germany and the US can be found in Table 3.9. For 
sisters, no specification yields a significant difference between the two countries. 
The German estimates are higher than the US ones but none of the differences is 
statistically significant.
For brothers there is a clear result for the age window 31–49 in as much as there 
is no significant difference between Germany and the US. But the result changes 
when the age restriction changes. For the younger cohort, brother correlations in 
the US are higher than in Germany, indicating higher intergenerational mobility 
in Germany compared to the US. The picture is the opposite for the more narrow 
age group. In two cases the German estimate is even significantly higher than the 
corresponding US one. Nevertheless, the result of similar levels of intergenerational 
mobility is supported for the main age window. But the different reactions to 
the variations in age and the conclusions resulting from this for the structure 
of intergenerational mobility in the two countries should be subject to further 
research on this topic.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter is the first to analyze sibling correlations in permanent earnings in 
Germany and it is the first to analyze Germany in a cross-country comparison with 
Denmark and the US. As existing studies show that these two countries mark the 
two ends of the scale of intergenerational mobility, this chapter studies where to 
position Germany in this ranking.
The importance of family and community background in Germany is higher 
than in Denmark and comparable to the US. This holds true for brothers and sisters. 
This means that in Denmark 20 percent of the inequality in permanent earnings 
can be attributed to family and community factors shared by brothers while the 
corresponding estimates are 43 percent in Germany and 45 percent in the US. For 
sisters the estimates are 19 percent for Denmark, 39 percent for Germany and 
29  percent for the US.
I present extensive robustness checks on these results and the developed 
ranking appears to be robust to most of the variations in sample selection rules.
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Given the results in the literature that cultural background is not a major 
determinant of the level of intergenerational mobility, the differences between the 
three countries are most likely due to differences in the institutional settings and 
thus can be influenced by policy decisions. To derive a detailed policy advise, future 
research should focus on the role of specific institutions.
3.8 Tables
Table 3.1: Existing literature on sibling correlations in permanent earnings
Country 
Sibling  
correlation
Cohort Method Author(s) 
Brothers 
China 0.57 not reported REML Eriksson and Zhang (2010)  
USA 0.49 1957–1965 REML Mazumder (2008)  
USA 0.45 1957–1965 REML Levine and Mazumder (2007) 
USA 0.45 1951–1958 ANOVA Solon et al. (1991) 
USA 0.43 1951–1967 ANOVA Björklund et al. (2002) 
Sweden 0.37 1962–1968 GMM Björklund et al. (2009) 
Sweden 0.25 1949–1957 REML Björklund et al. (2010) 
Sweden 0.25 1948–1965 ANOVA Björklund et al. (2002) 
Sweden 0.22 1962–1968 REML Björklund et al. (2007) 
Sweden 0.19 1951–1968 ANOVA Björklund et al. (2004) 
Finland 0.26 1953–1965 ANOVA Björklund et al. (2002) 
Finland 0.26 1950–1960 ANOVA Österbacka (2001)
Finland 0.24 1955–1965 ANOVA Björklund et al. (2004)
Denmark 0.23 1951–1968 ANOVA Björklund et al. (2002)
Norway 0.14 1953–1969 ANOVA Björklund et al. (2004)
Norway 0.14 1950–1970 ANOVA Björklund et al. (2002)
Sisters 
USA 0.34 1957–1965 REML Mazumder (2008)
Sweden 0.23 1949–1957 REML Björklund et al. (2010) 
Sweden 0.15 1951–1968 ANOVA Björklund et al. (2004) 
Finland 0.11 1955–1965 ANOVA Björklund et al. (2004) 
Finland 0.11 1950–1960 ANOVA Österbacka (2001) 
Norway 0.12 1953–1969 ANOVA Björklund et al. (2004) 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics (main scenario)
 Brothers Sisters 
Year N 
Median 
Earnings
Age N 
Median 
Earnings
Age 
 Denmark 
2002 53,027 51,636 39.3 47,794 40,205 38.8
2003 54,058 53,737 39.4 49,611 42,331 39.1
2004 54,963 56,015 39.6 51,540 43,972 39.4
2005 56,013 58,184 39.7 53,014 45,685 39.6
2006 56,817 61,564 39.7 54,599 48,307 39.7
2007 56,931 65,657 39.9 55,341 51,423 39.9
 Germany 
2002 666 42,112 36.3 336 23,967 35.4
2003 692 43,482 36.8 374 25,043 35.6
2004 700 44,149 37.2 418 25,289 36.0
2005 708 46,024 37.6 433 24,104 36.5
2006 712 46,073 37.9 439 24,476 37.1
2007 693 46,453 38.5 462 26,410 37.3
2008 703 47,953 38.6 483 27,027 37.3
 US 
1999 933 30,400 39.9 968 18,400 39.8
2001 936 35,700 40.1 1,012 21,250 39.9
2003 914 35,600 40.0 998 23,140 40.2
2005 938 42,300 39.9 970 25,380 40.4
2007 923 48,500 39.8 958 30,000 40.3
Note:  the table shows descriptive statistics for the three different national samples. In all three countries the 
figures are based on the definitions of the main scenario, i.e. age in [31 ; 49], annual earnings > 9000  DKK, 
1200  EUR, 1200 USD, siblings report the same mother and the same father. N is the number of observed 
individuals including singletons. For better comparability earnings are given in USD using the following 
exchange rates: 1 DKK = 0.1876 USD and 1 EUR = 1.3992 USD. 
Source: SOEP (2002–2008), PSID (1999–2007), IDA (2002–2007). 
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4  How important is cultural background for the level  
of intergenerational mobility?
Daniel D. Schnitzlein
(slightly revised version published in Economics Letters 114 (3), pp. 335–337)
All of us do not have equal talent, but all of us should have 
an equal opportunity to develop our talents.
(John F. Kennedy, San Diego, June 6th, 1963) 
4.1 Introduction and background
Equality of opportunities in the sense of “leveling the playing field” (Roemer, 
1998) is widely seen as a normative goal policy should reach in modern societies. 
Intergenerational economic mobility (hereafter IM) is often interpreted as an 
indicator of equality of opportunities. While there is a substantial literature on IM, 
both in economics and sociology (Solon, 1999; Black and Devereux, 2011), we still 
know little about the determinants of the transmission process. This note analyzes 
the importance of cultural background for the level of IM.
Theoretical models (Becker and Tomes, 1979) as well as empirical studies on 
the determinants of IM suggest that the transmission process can be influenced by 
numerous factors. In principle, these can be divided into two groups: institutional 
factors such as the educational system, tax system, and family policy and family 
related factors such as parental attitudes, parental behavior, and, as a result, 
parental resources. I assume in the following that these family related factors are 
heavily influenced by the cultural background of the family.39
Recent contributions followed different empirical strategies to analyze the 
determinants of IM. First, international comparisons (Björklund et al., 2002) show 
that the level of IM differs substantially in different countries. But in a cross-
country study both, institutional factors and cultural background vary between the 
countries. So it is not clear which group causes the differences in the level of IM.
Another approach is followed for example in Björklund et al. (2009) who 
studied the change in IM over time in Sweden using long-running administrative 
data. Holding cultural background constant, the change in institutions during the 
expansion of the welfare state was accompanied by a rise in IM. Another example 
39 For example Javo et al. (2004) show that child-rearing styles in Norway vary significantly between individuals with 
Norwegian and Sami cultural background.
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can be found in Bauer and Riphahn (2009) who used regional variation in institutions 
(age at school entry) in Switzerland to analyze effects on intergenerational 
educational mobility.
In contrast to the studies mentioned above that controlled for cultural 
background and used institutional variation as an identification strategy, this note 
adds to the literature by identifying the importance of cultural background by 
controlling for the institutional setting. Based on a unique Danish data set I analyze 
IM among different ethnic groups of second generation immigrants. As the data 
are collected in the same country and for the same period in time for all groups, it 
is ensured that all individuals face the same institutional framework. If institutions 
are the main determinant of IM, then different ethnic groups should show similar 
levels of IM. If, instead, cultural background matters most, the groups should differ 
in the estimated mobility levels.
4.2 Estimation strategy and data
There are several ways to measure IM. In the literature, most authors focused on 
intergenerational earnings correlations or elasticities. However, recent contributions 
analyzed sibling correlations instead (Mazumder, 2008; Björklund et al., 2009). 
Sibling correlations offer a broader measure of IM compared to intergenerational 
earnings correlations. They cover not only the influence of parental earnings on 
the economic outcome of the offspring but the influence of all family background 
and community factors that are shared by siblings (Solon, 1999). Thus they are 
more adequate to assess IM, especially if IM is seen as an indicator of equality of 
opportunities.
Following this approach, I use sibling correlations in permanent earnings as a 
measure of IM. The correlations are estimated as the within-cluster correlation ρ 
in the following multilevel model: 
  (4.1)
with yijt reflecting annual earnings of sibling j of family i in year t . The matrix X 
contains year indicators and polynomials of age. β are coefficients to be estimated. 
αi  and μij denote the family specific and the individual specific component of 
the error term and εijt captures transitory fluctuations. The sibling correlation 
 is calculated as the ratio of the variance of the family-specific 
component and the sum of the variances of the family-specific and the individual-
specific component of the error term. The sibling correlation is interpreted as the 
share of the variance (inequality) in permanent earnings that can be attributed 
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to factors shared by siblings. The multilevel model is estimated via restricted 
maximum likelihood.
I use data from the Danish Integrated Database for Labor Market Research 
(IDA) which combines information from various registers of administrative data 
collected by the Danish government and administered by Statistics Denmark. Being 
administrative data the IDA database covers the entire Danish population. So there 
is no problem of sample selection or panel attrition (except for natural attrition). 
Additionally I had access to information on the immigrant status of the individuals 
in IDA which also comes from administrative registers. The large number of 
individuals in the data allows me to analyze IM not only for all second generation 
immigrants in Denmark but also separately for immigrants with German, Pakistani, 
Turkish and Moroccan background.40 The analysis is restricted to men because there 
might be a selection bias connected to the labor market participation of women 
in these subgroups. I use annual earnings for the years 2002–2006 for individuals 
aged 26–41. Following the literature, I exclude observations with annual earnings 
lower than 9000 DKK (around 1200 Euro in 2005 prices). The main descriptive 
statistics of the remaining sample are shown in Table 4.1.
4.3 Results
Table 4.2 shows the estimation results. The estimated brother correlation for 
Danish natives shows the well known result that the level of IM is very high in 
Denmark (Björklund et al., 2002). Only about 17 percent of inequality in permanent 
earnings can be attributed to family and community factors (first element in bold 
type row of Table 4.2). The next five columns of Table 4.2 contain the estimated 
brother correlations for the second generation immigrant subsamples. With the 
institutional setting being the same for all these groups, I interpret the differences 
in the level of IM between the immigrant groups as an indicator of the importance 
of cultural background.
The estimated brother correlations range from 0.238 for German immigrants 
to 0.285 for Moroccan immigrants. This is remarkable for two reasons: first, 
even though the cultural background varies significantly between these groups 
this seems to have no influence on the level of IM. Second IM estimates based 
on brother correlations, for example, for Germans in Germany lie around 0.43 
(Schnitzlein, 2011b). I interpret these results as support for the hypothesis 
40 In an earlier version of this note, I also present results for immigrants with Yugoslavian background. But as this 
group contains a high number of refugees and thus is not comparable to the other groups that mainly consist of 
labor migrants I did not include them here. The results for this group and a discussion can be found in Schnitzlein 
(2011a).
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that cultural background is not a major influence factor and that instead the 
institutional framework is an important determinant of IM. This is in line with the 
result, mentioned above, that the change in the institutional framework in Sweden 
was accompanied by a clear rise in IM (Björklund et al., 2009).
There remains one deviation to explain: the estimates for all immigrant 
groups are higher compared to that for native Danes, even though the result for 
natives falls within a 95 percent confidence interval of the correlations for the 
immigrant groups. At first glance, this seems to be in contrast with the just stated 
hypothesis on the role of cultural background. But as mentioned in section 2, a 
sibling correlation has to be interpreted as a broad measure of IM. It covers not 
only the influence of family related factors, but also neighborhood and community 
effects. So in the absence of perfect integration such neighborhood and community 
effects should lead to higher brother correlations for immigrants than for natives. 
Additionally their importance should increase with the (cultural) distance of the 
immigrant’s country of origin to Denmark. This explanation is supported by two 
aspects of the results in Table 4.2. First, the only estimate that is clearly lower than 
all others is the one for native Danes. Second, among the immigrant groups, the 
estimated brother correlation is lowest for Germans which are, at least compared 
to the other groups, closest to native Danes.
4.4 Conclusions
Using results on brother correlations for different groups of second generation 
immigrants based on administrative data from Denmark, this note analyzes the role 
of cultural background in the determination of the level of IM. The results indicate 
that cultural background is not a major determinant of IM and that instead the 
institutional framework is more relevant for the level of IM. This implies, e.g., 
that low IM is not a culturally determined, fixed feature of a society but could 
be influenced by means of social policy. To derive detailed policy advice, future 
research should more explicitly try to identify the most important institutions.
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4.5 Tables
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
Natives German Pakistani Turkish Moroccan
Earnings Age Earnings Age Earnings Age Earnings Age Earnings Age
2002 260,252 33.57 266,501 34.80 200,348 27.38 192,019 27.63 212,132 28.29
2003 270,561 33.69 273,997 34.81 210,920 27.84 201,167 27.81 209,578 28.66
2004 280,379 33.79 279,368 35.01 225,833 28.45 201,180 27.93 230,989 28.98
2005 291,579 33.87 298,395 35.29 238,450 28.88 217,261 28.16 232,983 29.17
2006 308,586 33.92 311,344 35.18 264,614 29.32 231,791 28.42 262,680 29.41
Note:  descriptive statistics for natives and four different groups of second generation immigrants; given are 
median earnings and mean age for every group; only male individuals aged 26–41 with annual earnings 
higher than 9,000 DKK are included. All figures in 2005 real values. Basis is the full population of second 
generation immigrants and a 10 percent random sample of natives. The number of observations, individuals 
and families for the different groups are shown in the last three lines of Table 4.2.
Source: IDA (2002–2006). 
Table 4.2: Brother correlations
Natives all 2nd gen German Pakistani Turkish Moroccan
Family component (  ) 0.059 0.126 0.105 0.109 0.105 0.144
(0.004) (0.021) (0.054) (0.035) (0.046) (0.090)
Individual component (  ) 0.298 0.353 0.337 0.315 0.308 0.362
(0.004) (0.022) (0.057) (0.038) (0.048) (0.093)
Transitory component (  ) 0.142 0.275 0.156 0.299 0.360 0.303
(0.000) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013) (0.022)
Correlation (ρ) 0.165*** 0.263*** 0.238** 0.256*** 0.255** 0.285*
(0.010) (0.042) (0.119) (0.079) (0.108) (0.169)
Observations 240,737 13,512 1,384 2,502 2,518 601
Families 49,584 3,661 328 611 843 152
Individuals 63,829 4,423 392 832 982 209
Note:  REML-estimates based on a sample of male 2nd generation immigrants (excluding immigrants from 
Yugoslavia) and native Danes, lower earnings limit of 9,000 DKK, age between 26 and 41; standard errors of 
brother correlations are calculated via bivariate delta method; standard errors in parentheses; *** indicate 
significance on 1 percent level; ** indicate significance on 5 percent level; * indicates significance on  
10 percent level. 
Source: IDA (2002–2006). 
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5 Wage mobility in East and West Germany
Regina T. Riphahn and Daniel D. Schnitzlein
5.1 Introduction
Even though high levels of income mobility can, both, increase or reduce individual 
welfare, the economic literature tends to stress its beneficial aspects. This goes back 
to Friedman (1962), who introduced the notion that income mobility can function 
as an equalizer of long-term personal incomes. Shorrocks’ index (Shorrocks, 1978) 
measures to what extent income mobility reduces income inequality. High income 
mobility promises the disadvantaged of today a better position in the future and 
balances the distribution of lifetime incomes. A broad and often methodological 
literature studies wage and earnings mobility, its developments over time and in 
international comparison.41
Motivated by the recent rise of wage inequality in Germany (e.g. Dustmann 
et al., 2009), by the availability of new, long running administrative data, and by 
the event of German unification this chapter studies wage mobility in Germany. We 
describe wage inequality and mobility over the last 35 years in West Germany and 
the trends since unification in the former communist East Germany. In addition, 
we test hypotheses regarding the determinants of aggregate mobility shifts using 
linked employee-employer data. Our novel approach to the study of wage mobility 
generates insights on structural shifts in the East German transition economy and 
the West German labor market over time.
So far, the international evidence on the development of wage mobility over 
time does not yield unambiguous conclusions or general trends. Kopczuk et al. 
(2010), who investigate U.S. earnings inequality and mobility between 1937 and 
2004, find that short-run mobility, measured over two- or five-year periods was 
rather stable since the 1950s. In contrast, longer-run mobility has been increasing 
for females and slightly declining for males.42 Dickens (2000) evaluates British 
evidence on wage mobility from 1975 to 1994 and concludes that mobility has 
been declining since the 1970s. In contrast, Jenkins (2011) considers the period 
41 For recent contributions on the U.S. see Kopczuk et al. (2010), Shin and Solon (2011), Buchinsky and Hunt (1999), 
for studies on the U.K. see Dickens (2000), or Jarvis and Jenkins (1998), a recent contribution on France is Buchinsky 
et al. (2003), two studies on Austria are Hofer and Weber (2002) and Raferzeder and Winter-Ebmer (2007). For 
comparative studies see Aaberge et al. (2002), Chen (2009), van Kerm (2004), van Kerm (2006), Jenkins and van 
Kerm (2006), Maasoumi and Trede (2001), Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002), Ayala and Sastre (2008), OECD (1997) 
and for methodological contributions Fields and Ok (1996), Fields and Ok (1999a), Fields and Ok (1999b) or Gregg 
and Vittori (2008) among others.
42 Buchinsky and Hunt (1999) study wage mobility for the aging cohorts of National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and 
find falling mobility over the time period 1979–1991.
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1991 to 2006 based on the British Household Panel Survey and finds hardly any 
mobility change over time. Buchinsky et al. (2003) find falling mobility in French 
earnings between 1967 and 1999.
Most prior contributions on German wage mobility used data of the German 
Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) covering West Germany since 1984. This literature is 
dominated by comparisons of West German and U.S. wage mobility.43 The results of 
these comparisons vary, as different survey years, income measures, and mobility 
indicators are applied. Some authors find that wage mobility is higher in the U.S. 
(Burkhauser et al., 1997; Chen, 2009) and others find the opposite even for the 
same period of observation.44 Only few studies evaluate mobility developments over 
time. In their comparison of East and West German income mobility early after 
unification Hauser and Fabig (1999) find that mobility was initially much higher 
in East Germany but declined already by 1995. Gernandt (2009) applies SOEP data 
(1984–2007) for West Germany and studies the standard deviation of changes in 
individual rank positions in the wage distribution. He finds a substantial mobility 
decline over time.
Most studies in the international literature on wage and income mobility 
focus on the measurement and description of mobility without attention to its 
determinants. Among the contributions that address the mechanisms behind 
mobility developments, three approaches dominate. The first approach was 
initiated by Lillard and Willis (1978), Lillard and Weiss (1979), MaCurdy (1982), and 
Abowd and Card (1989). These studies only indirectly analyze aggregate mobility 
developments as they follow individual wage and earnings developments over time 
and focus on the covariance structure of earnings. They determine the time series 
representation of individual wages which best fits the data.45 This literature differs 
from our approach in that it focuses on the stochastic nature of the individual 
earnings process over time rather than on mobility as an aggregate labor market 
characteristic.
The second approach in the study of mobility determinants consists of 
decompositions of mobility indicators. The literature holds numerous procedures: (a) 
some authors consider different mobility patterns for different types of household 
incomes (e.g. Chen, 2009), (b) some split the sample in different subsamples (e.g. 
Maasoumi and Trede, 2001; van Kerm, 2004; Ayala and Sastre, 2008; Chen, 2009), 
or (c) differentiate between and within group mobility (Buchinsky and Hunt, 1999); 
43 See, e.g., Burkhauser et al. (1997), Burkhauser and Poupore (1997), Maasoumi and Trede (2001), Gottschalk and 
Spolaore (2002), van Kerm (2004), Jenkins and van Kerm (2006), and Chen (2009).
44 See, e.g., Burkhauser and Poupore (1997), Maasoumi and Trede (2001), Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002). Jenkins and 
van Kerm (2006) consider this difference to be a function of the type of mobility measure.
45 For more recent contributions see e.g. Baker (1997) and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004, 2010).
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(d) some studies consider different contributions to overall mobility for different 
quantiles of the initial distribution (Gregg and Vittori, 2008; van Kerm, 2003, 2006), 
and, finally, (e) based on Fields and Ok (1999b) some authors decompose mobility 
(measured as per capita income movement, i.e. absolute difference in log-incomes) 
into mobility due to overall economic growth and mobility due to the transfer of 
income within a given distribution (e.g. Chen, 2009; van Kerm, 2004; Ayala and 
Sastre, 2008).
Finally, a third approach studies individual-level determinants of wage 
dynamics: Hunt (2001) investigates the determinants of year-to-year changes 
in East German wages immediately after unification. Raferzeder and Winter-
Ebmer (2007) and Gernandt (2009) investigate correlation patterns of changes 
in individual income positions between 1994 and 2001. Generally, these analyses 
suggest that wage mobility is concentrated among individuals at the beginning of 
their labor market careers.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we study German 
wage mobility based on a new administrative data set. Our data provide large 
samples, go back further in time than prior contributions (to 1975) and also 
cover very recent developments, i.e. through 2008. Compared to survey data, our 
administrative data promise higher precision, less measurement error, and less 
attrition (cf. Gottschalk and Huynh, 2010). Second, the data allow us to compare 
the developments in East and West Germany in the two decades since unification, 
which is missing in the literature so far. Finally, we go beyond the mere description 
of wage mobility over time and between groups and test specific hypotheses 
regarding the determinants of changes in wage mobility. We apply aggregate and 
detailed decompositions based on recentered influence function (RIF) regressions 
as introduced by Firpo et al. (2009) and presented by Fortin et al. (2011) to quantify 
the contribution of potential determinants of aggregate mobility.
Our main results are as follows: first, we observe substantial declines in East 
German wage mobility in the 1990s and moderate reductions since the late 1990s 
in both East and West Germany. Since about 1997, wage mobility in East Germany 
had fallen below West German levels. Second, we confirm the extant evidence on 
rising wage inequality in Germany. Therefore, mobility is less and less effective as 
an “equalizer” of inequality in the sense of Friedman (1962). Third, the results yield 
that a substantial part of the mobility decline in East Germany is associated with 
changes in observable characteristics, particularly those describing job stability 
and employment characteristics. However, also structural and unexplained factors 
contributed to the wage mobility decline in both parts of Germany.
The chapter is structured as follows: in section two we describe our data, 
key variables, and measurement issues. Section three describes the developments 
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of inequality and mobility in West and East Germany. Section four derives our 
hypotheses regarding determinants of mobility from the literature and outlines the 
empirical approach chosen to test them. The empirical results are presented and 
discussed in section five before we conclude in section six.
5.2 Data and measurement issues
Our analysis uses the newly available SIAB (Sample of Integrated Labour Market 
Biographies) data, a two percent random sample of administrative records drawn 
from the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB 1975–2008).46 The data contain 
the employment history of 1.6 million individuals and inform about benefit receipt, 
job-search, and individual characteristics that can be matched with establishment 
characteristics. The IEB data describes all individuals covered by the statutory 
retirement insurance, i.e. about 80 percent of the German labor force, as well as all 
individuals registered with the federal employment agency.47
The SIAB data have two weaknesses. First, they provide only a limited number 
of available covariates, e.g. we only know about workers’ full-time vs. part-time 
employment status rather than the actual number of hours worked.48 Second, the 
information on daily wages is censored: since retirement insurance contributions 
are paid as a fixed earnings share only up to an upper threshold, earnings values 
beyond the threshold are not registered in the data. This threshold value is fixed 
nominally every year, separately for East and West Germany. We apply “consistent 
top-coding” to avoid time inconsistencies in the share of censored observations 
(see Burkhauser et al., 2009) and consistently censor the top 15 and 10 percent of 
each annual wage distribution for West and East Germany, respectively.
Our sample covers all full-time employed individuals in East and West 
Germany, between 25 and 60 years of age. We consider every individual who is 
employed full-time at some point in the calendar year. East and West German 
subsamples are distinguished based on the individuals’ place of work.49 In the 
analysis of wage mobility between periods t and t  + k we use observations who 
were full-time employed in the base (t ) and the final (t +k ) reporting year, who 
worked in the same region of the country at both points in time, and who met 
the age restrictions in both periods. Table 5.6 in the appendix A provides the 
46 The SIAB is the successor of the widely used IABS data set of the Institute for Employment Research.
47 Excluded are civil servants, self employed workers, and those in military service. Individuals are registered with the 
federal employment agency, e.g., if they are unemployed or participate in training measures.
48 Full time employment is coded if the person’s contract runs over that number of weekly hours which is considered 
full time in the employee’s establishment. Depending on bilateral bargaining agreements this number may vary 
between 35 and 45 hours per week. For details on the data see Dorner et al. (2010).
49 Observations from Berlin are considered East Germans since unification and are omitted before 1992.
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overall number of observations used in the mobility analysis for the two regional 
samples by year.
Our key variable of interest describes real daily wages in 2008 Euro, deflated 
using a national consumer price index. We disregard employment relationships 
with daily wages below 12 Euro.50 Next, we describe the long run evidence on wage 
inequality and wage mobility for full-time workers in East and West Germany.
5.3 Inequality and mobility patterns in East and West Germany
5.3.1 Inequality patterns
In this section we briefly replicate the evidence on wage inequality in Germany as 
presented e.g. by Dustmann et al. (2009). Based on the SIAB data, we extend their 
observation window to include the more recent years and the East German subsample.
Figure 5.1 presents the development of real wages at the 20th, 50th, and 80th 
percentile of the full wage distribution, i.e. including censored observations, as well 
as the real censoring threshold over time. The 80th percentile of the distribution 
always remains below the censoring threshold. The evidence on West German 
inequality confirms prior findings (e.g. Dustmann et al., 2009; Gernandt, 2009): 
inequality rises in the upper part of distribution since the early 1980s and in the 
lower part of the distribution since the early 1990s, recently with falling real wages 
at the 20th percentile. In East Germany, inequality in the top half of the distribution 
increased over time, while the 20th and 50th percentiles moved almost in tandem. 
Again, we find falling real wages at the median and below.
Figure 5.9 in the appendix A presents the relative development of real wages 
since 1975 in West and since 1992 in East and West Germany. The graphs yield 
higher wage growth for the upper than for the lower percentiles of the respective 
wage distributions, with overall higher growth rates in East than in West Germany. 
Inequality rose both in the upper and the lower half of the real wage distributions.
To sum up, we depict the aggregate inequality developments using three 
distributional measures: Gini coefficients and the mean log deviation of annual 
real wages in Figure 5.2 and the spread between the 80th and 20th percentile of 
the annual wage distribution in Figure 5.10, all calculated separately for the two 
regional subsamples.51 In West Germany, wage inequality has been rising steadily 
and in particular since the late 1990s. In East Germany, wage inequality has been 
rising continuously.
50 Dustmann et al. (2009) use a similar cutoff value.
51 We also studied the Gini coefficients for the full earnings distribution including censored values. The developments 
are very similar to those depicted for the uncensored part of the distribution.
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5.3.2 Mobility patterns
Increasing cross-sectional wage inequality does not have to enhance permanent 
and lifetime inequality if it is balanced by increasing intertemporal wage mobility. 
Next, we study the development of wage mobility over time.
The literature uses a number of different indicators of wage mobility. To ensure 
that our findings are reliable and independent of any particular chosen measure, 
we apply different indicators. We first study indicators that are based on individual 
rank positions in the wage distribution. In particular we look at (a) the probability 
of shifting to a different quintile of the wage distribution, (b) the probability of 
jumping by more than 10 rank positions, (c) the distribution of changes in rank 
positions, and (d) rank correlations over alternative interval lengths in East and 
West Germany. Our second set of indicators uses the Shorrocks index (Shorrocks, 
1978), which describes the extent to which short term wage mobility can reduce 
long term inequality. Finally, we compare the development of mean absolute and 
relative wage changes over time.
Figure 5.3 summarizes transition matrices, where the probability of staying 
in any given quintile between periods t and t  +  4 is compared to the probability 
of moving by one, two, three, or four quintiles. For the West German subsample 
we show the developments since 1975, for the East German sample those since 
1992. Since the last year of our data is 2008, the last transition is depicted for the 
starting year 2004, which represents the mobility between 2004 and 2008. Mobility 
patterns vary between regions: among West Germans (see top panel) mobility 
appears to be rather stable over time. Only recently, we observe an increase in 
immobility, i.e. in the probability of remaining in a given quintile (labeled “stayer”). 
Correspondingly, the probability of position shifts by one or two quintiles slightly 
dropped. The probabilities for larger position shifts remained at below ten percent.
The shifts in East German mobility are more pronounced. Here the probability 
of staying in a given quintile, increased since 1992 from around 50 to 70 percent 
(bottom panel) and thus assimilated to West German levels. Thus, we observe a 
general trend to lower mobility, particularly in East Germany. This matches the 
evidence provided by Gernandt (2009) using SOEP data and the picture recently 
drawn for the U.S. by Kopczuk et al. (2010).
As a second and somewhat more detailed indicator based on rank positions, we 
study the development of the probability of changing the individual rank position 
by more than 10 percentage points within a window of four years. Figure  5.4 
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presents the development for the two regional subsamples.52 A high probability 
of a ten percentage point shift reflects high mobility. The mobility level in West 
Germany slightly declined between 1975 and 1985, it increased through 1989, and 
subsequently declined substantially from about 40 to 30 percent. For East Germany 
the development is more striking. Here, mobility declined from initially about 55 to 
about 25 percent, i.e. to levels clearly below the West German values.
One shortcoming of quintile or 10 percentage point transitions is that they 
do not describe developments within the considered ranges.53 Figure 5.5 addresses 
this problem and presents the distribution of changes in relative rank positions 
separately for three periods in West and for two periods in East Germany.54 The 
dispersion in rank adjustments over time is roughly constant in West Germany 
(see top row). In East Germany (see bottom row) the variance of the rank change 
distribution visibly declines between the first and the second observation period 
(1992–1996 vs. 2004–2008).
Figure 5.6 presents the development of individual rank correlation coefficients 
over time, for East and West Germany, and for time intervals of different lengths. 
Correlations are higher if mobility is measured over shorter observation windows, 
e.g. between t and t  +  1 versus t and t  +  4. Rank correlation coefficients increase 
over time in almost all depicted series. In East Germany immobility increases 
strongly over time reaching West German levels.
The correlation patterns over alternative time horizons already indicate that 
mobility developments can vary in the short and the long run. The Shorrocks index 
(M ) describes the extent to which wage mobility balances short-run inequality 
(Shorrocks, 1978). If period-specific inequality is measured by an indicator G (z ), we 
can compare the average of T period-specific inequality measures with inequality 
averaged over T periods. If the latter is smaller than the former, intertemporal 
mobility serves to reduce short-run inequality: 
  (5.1)
The Shorrocks index is defined as M with
  (5.2)
52 Since censored observations do not change their measurable rank position over time we calculated the rates using 
only the uncensored observations.
53 In addition, these mobility indicators cannot differentiate between more or less dispersed distributions.
54 Here, censored wage observations are omitted. Since all censored individuals occupy the same rank, their 
consideration would vastly increase the share of zero rank changes.
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If mobility reduces income inequality, the inequality of averaged incomes is below 
the average of period-specific inequality measures. The larger the difference 
between these two indicators, the larger mobility and the closer M is to one. If 
there is no mobility, the inequality of the average and the average of the inequality 
measures are identical and M is close to zero.55 Figure 5.7 presents the development 
of the Shorrocks index when we apply two alternative inequality indicators G, 
mean log deviation and the Gini coefficient to East and West German samples. 
The developments over time are similar to prior measures. Overall, mobility in West 
Germany is lower in the early 2000s than in the 1970s, even though the process was 
not one of a linear decline. In East Germany, mobility has been declining without 
interruption since unification. It soon fell below West German wage mobility.
In our final group of mobility measures we calculate the development of 
absolute and relative changes in real wages over time. Rising absolute wage changes 
over time would be suggestive of increasing mobility. Appendix Figure  5.11 shows 
the development of the mean absolute individual real wage change across intervals 
of different lengths for the regional subsamples. While the values fluctuate, the 
overall patterns, particularly when considering wage developments over longer 
periods, are clear: mean absolute wage changes trend downwards both in East 
Germany since the first measurements and in West Germany since the mid 1980s. 
Appendix Figure 5.12 describes relative instead of absolute wage changes over 
time. Again, we find general declines in mean relative wage changes over time. 
This confirms the decline in wage mobility that we found using other indicators.
Overall, the evidence supports two stylized facts: (i) wage mobility declined 
over time and (ii) it declined faster in East than West Germany. In the next sections, 
we study the mechanisms behind these developments.
5.4  Explaining the mobility decline: hypotheses and empirical 
approach
5.4.1 Hypotheses
The literature offers a range of hypotheses that may explain changes in aggregate 
wage mobility. These hypotheses fall in four groups: connected to labor supply, 
a first group of factors considers individual characteristics (Z ); closer to labor 
demand, a second group of potential mobility determinants focuses on job stability 
55 The literature applies a variety of inequality measures to calculate Shorrocks index (e.g. the Gini coefficient, mean 
log deviation, Theil I1, or Theil I2), which vary in their sensitivity to changes in different parts of the income 
distribution (e.g. Hofer and Weber, 2002). We present results using the Gini coefficient, which is particularly 
sensitive to changes in the middle of the distribution and using the mean log deviation which is particularly 
sensitive to changes in the lower part of the distribution.
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(J ) and a third on employment characteristics (E ). A last group considers regional 
and aggregate developments (R ) as determinants of wage mobility. Next, we 
discuss each of the four groups of hypotheses which we later test empirically.
Wage mobility is affected by individual characteristics including changes over 
the life-cycle (Drewianka, 2010; Raferzeder and Winter-Ebmer, 2007; Gernandt, 
2009; Aaberge et al., 2002; Kohn and Antonczyk, 2011).56 Clearly, the composition 
of the East German labor force, for which mobility changed the most, with 
respect to age, sex, and education has changed since unification: East Germany 
experienced demographic aging and fertility declines (Lechner, 2001), selective 
out-migration (Hunt, 2006; Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2009), modifications 
of the education system (Riphahn and Trübswetter, 2011), and shifts in female labor 
force participation (Hanel and Riphahn, 2011). In order to gauge the joint effects 
of changes in work force characteristics we consider the following individual 
characteristics (Z ): age, sex, education, citizenship, an indicator for whether an 
individual will leave East Germany for the West in the future, and the rank position 
in the income distribution in the base period starting from which mobility is 
measured.
Wage mobility is typically associated with job changes. Therefore, overall 
changes in job stability and tenure are likely to be connected to shifts in wage 
mobility (Stevens, 2001; Farber, 2007, 2008; Shin and Solon, 2011; Gottschalk 
and Moffitt, 1994, 2009). In the U.S., job stability declined recently suggesting 
an increase in wage mobility. In East Germany, it is plausible that job stability 
increased since unification, which should reduce wage mobility. To test these 
mechanisms, we consider three indicators of job stability (J ): individual employer 
changes, individual unemployment experience between t and t  +  4, and tenure 
with the current employer.
A third group of factors relevant to wage mobility relates to employer and 
employment characteristics. In this group we distinguish four different mechanisms. 
First, the recent decline in unionization and wage compression may contribute to 
the rise in wage inequality (e.g. Dustmann et al., 2009; Antonczyk et al., 2010b; 
Kohn and Antonczyk, 2011) and may affect wage mobility (Gottschalk and 
Moffitt, 1994). Particularly in East Germany, employers left collective bargaining 
arrangements as a result of overly generous wage negotiations (Stephen and 
Schroeder, 2007). Second, Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) argue that employment 
shifts between industries affect aggregate wage mobility if workers move from 
more stable (e.g. manufacturing) to more instable (e.g. services) sectors. This is 
56 Antonczyk et al. (2010a) point out that wage inequality over the life-cycle changed in different ways for different 
workers, which suggests shifts in age-mobility profiles over time.
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particularly relevant for the East German industrial structure which adjusted 
after unification with shifting industry and employer size composition. As a third 
mechanism, Comin et al. (2009) and Gottschalk and Moffitt (2009) show the 
connection between wage instability and the volatility of firm performance and 
discuss firm stability as a determinant of wage mobility. Fourth and finally, given 
the relevance of occupation-specific human capital (Schmillen and Möller, 2010; 
Firpo et al., 2011), of skill biased technical change, and increasing specialization it 
may have become more difficult to transfer human capital between employments 
over time (Gottschalk and Moffitt, 2009). This again may affect wage mobility. 
To control for the impact of these mechanisms on wage mobility we consider a 
variety of indicators (E ). We use employer size, and its change between t and t  +  4 
as indicators of employer stability. We control for industry and occupation as of 
period t as well as for the change of industry and of occupational category by an 
employee over time.
Our fourth and final set of factors considers regional developments that might 
affect wage mobility such as the business cycle, unemployment rates, GDP growth, 
as well as specifics of the regional employment structures such as the share of the 
self-employed (cf. Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1994, 2009; Anger, forthcoming). As 
summary measures for these macroeconomic indicators we consider state-level 
fixed effects.
In order to answer the question, which of the four factor groups contributes 
most strongly to the decline in German wage mobility, we pursue a decomposition 
approach (cf. Fortin et al., 2011). The decomposition framework suggests that the 
observed mobility decline must be connected either to composition effects, i.e. 
to shifts in the observable determinants of wage changes, or to structure effects, 
i.e. to shifts in unobservables or in correlation patterns as reflected in regression 
coefficients. We first evaluate the magnitude of the overall composition and 
structure effects and then study the detailed impact of the four factor groups on 
wage mobility. The next section explains our approach.
5.4.2 Empirical approach
To quantify the contribution of the four factor groups to the change in wage 
mobility over time we apply the recentered influence function (RIF) method as 
introduced by Firpo et al. (2009) and discussed in Firpo et al. (2007) and Fortin 
et al. (2011). Similar to the Oaxaca Blinder decomposition which focuses on 
differences in the means of distributions, the RIF method permits decompositions 
of differences in other functionals of distributions such as the variance. The 
aggregate decomposition separates the effect of changes in characteristics and 
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coefficients, while the detailed decomposition assigns (groups of) covariates their 
specific contribution to the difference in the distributional measure.
As our indicator of wage mobility we use the variance of the distribution of 
individual changes in rank positions in annual wage distributions between periods 
t and t  +  4 (cf. Figure 5.5). We separately consider the East and West German 
labor markets. The measure reflects our interpretation of wage mobility as a 
characteristic of regional labor markets. Let yi represent the change in the relative 
rank position of individual i between period t and t  +  4. yi takes on values in the 
interval [–99, 99]. In a balanced panel of individual wage observations the mean 
of y is zero and independent of wage mobility. Wage mobility, instead, is reflected 
in the variance of y: labor markets with high wage mobility are characterized by 
a high dispersion of rank changes while labor markets with low wage mobility 
feature mostly small changes in rank positions and thus a small variance of y. 
Since we are interested in decomposing the observed mobility difference over time 
we compare the variance of an early and a late period.
The approach (Firpo et al., 2007, 2009) provides a method to measure the 
impact of changes in the distribution of covariates at the individual and aggregate 
level on the change in the variance of y. The influence function of the variance, 
IF  (yi ; σ 
2 ), describes the influence of an individual observation yi on the aggregate 
variance, σ 2: 
  (5.3)
The recentered influence function (RIF) adds this influence function back to the 
observed variance (see equation 5.4), which after substituting the expected value 
of the influence function yields the original variance (see equation 5.5): 
  (5.4)
 (5.5)
Firpo et al. (2007) show that the conditional expectation of RIF  (yi ; σ 
2 ) can be 
modeled as a linear function of explanatory variables X: 
  (5.6)
The RIF regression coefficients (γ ) provide partial effects of changes in the 
distribution of the covariates X on the variance of the conditional distribution of  y. 
In this framework we can separate the contribution of covariate (X  ) and structure 
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effects to the explanation of overall changes in wage mobility over time.57 The 
overall change in wage mobility between a late (t  = 0) and an early (t  = 1) period 
is defined as 
  (5.7)
and can be decomposed into two parts 
  (5.8)
where  represents the composition effect and  indicates the structure effect. 
Firpo et al. (2007) show that this decomposition can be obtained as a Oaxaca 
Blinder decomposition of equation (5.6).
However, the authors recommend a two step procedure: the first step 
consists of reweighting the data following the well known DiNardo et al. (1996) 
procedure. The objective of this reweighting procedure is to account for potential 
non-linearities in the true conditional expectation of equation (5.6). Without 
reweighting, the decomposition yields consistent results only if the true conditional 
expectation of equation (5.6) is in fact linear, which imposes a strong assumption 
on the data. The reweighting procedure generates counterfactual observations 
(t  = 2) that result if individuals of the late period (t  =  0) had the same distribution 
of observable characteristics as individuals observed in the early period (t  = 1). The 
reweighting procedure is based on estimating a probit model on the probability of 
being observed in the early period.58
In the second step the decomposition analysis is then performed on the 
reweighted data. The composition and structure effects are calculated as follows:
= 2 + 2 ( )= 2 00 +0 00  (5.9)
and 
 (5.10)
  represents the approximation error. It reflects the imprecision of the 
approximation of  through RIF regressions, which is enhanced if the linearity 
57 The literature frequently uses the terminology of explained vs. unexplained effects. We follow Fortin et al. (2011) 
and label explained effects composition effects and unexplained effects structure effects.
58 Our probit specification considers the explanatory variables of the decomposition analysis and their interactions. 
The results of the reweighting step are presented in Tables 5.9 and 5.10 in the appendix B. In both tables, the last 
three columns present the difference of the mean characteristics in the reweighted and original period. These 
differences are very small or equal to zero in almost all cases.
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of the RIF regression is inappropriate. The approximation error disappears if the 
conditional expectation of the variance is indeed linear in X (see Firpo et al., 2007). 
 represents the reweighting error that disappears if the reweighting matrix is 
consistently estimated and  .
The results identify  and  under two assumptions. (i) Ignorability requires 
that conditional on X the unobservable determinants of the dependent variable in 
equation (5.6) are independent of the assignment to treatment group t, i.e. to the 
early vs. late period in our mobility comparison. (ii) Overlapping support requires 
that there is no set of covariates X which is exclusively observed among members 
of treatment group 0 or 1.
To test our hypotheses and to determine the contribution of different groups 
of covariates to the decline in wage mobility over time we use linear regressions of 
the individual contribution to aggregate wage mobility considering the four factor 
groups (Z, J, E, and R ) defined above and ε as a random error term:
 (5.11)
Based on this model we can calculate composition (5.12) and structure (5.13) 
effects for each covariate group k: 
  (5.12)
  
(5.13)
Under the stated assumptions this procedure can be applied to evaluate the 
contribution of the four factor groups to the observed changes in wage mobility. 
We follow Firpo et al. (2007) and estimate the standard errors of all indicators by 
bootstrap procedures. There are several advantages connected to the application 
of the RIF procedure: first, it allows us to decompose the patterns behind changes 
in variances, second, in contrast to other decomposition procedures it permits 
both aggregate and detailed decompositions, and third, the results of the detailed 
decomposition for each group of covariates are not path dependent. However, 
the RIF procedure also suffers the disadvantages of the standard Oaxaca Blinder 
decomposition: the measured contribution of covariates to the structure effect 
depends on the chosen reference group and results generally depend on which 
of the two comparison groups t  =  0,1 is the reference. In response to the first 
disadvantage we do not present detailed structure effects. In response to the 
second point we perform a robustness check of our results.
IAB-Bibliothek 33282
Wage mobility in East and West Germany
5.4.3 Descriptive evidence
The dependent variable of the RIF regression (see equations 5.6 or 5.11) describes 
the individual contribution to the variance of the wage change distribution. The 
means of the dependent variable are depicted by region and calendar year in Figure 
5.8: for any year t it shows the variance of the distribution of individual rank 
changes between periods t and t  +  4. The patterns in Figure 5.8 strongly resemble 
those in Figures 5.4 and 5.7. The values for West Germany followed a U-shape 
between 1975 and 1990. In the early 1990s wage mobility was substantially higher 
in East than in West Germany. It continuously declined since then in East Germany 
dropping from values of 470 in 1992 to 191 in 2004. In West Germany mobility has 
been declining since 1997. Since 1996 East German wage mobility is below West 
German levels, which confirms the results of section 3 above.
In our empirical analysis we focus on a comparison of the East and West 
German developments since unification. We consider numerous variables to 
measure the impact of the four factor groups discussed in section 4.1. These 
variables are described in greater detail in the data appendix, which includes 
descriptive statistics.
5.5 Results and discussion
5.5.1 Empirical results
The empirical analysis evaluates the contribution of the four factor groups to the 
decline in wage mobility. In an initial step we regress the individual contribution to 
the aggregate variance on the four factor groups (cf. equation 5.11). The estimates 
of these results are available in the appendix B. We present the results of our 
decomposition analysis in Table 5.1, where we compare wage mobility observed 
in the early years after unification (base year t  = 1993)59 to that observed most 
recently (base year t  = 2004).60 Panel A of Table 5.1 describes that the observed 
variance of the rank change distribution dropped significantly, by half in East and 
by 15 percent in West Germany over the observed period. Panel B of Table 5.1 
presents the results of the aggregate decomposition (cf. equation 5.8), where we 
59 The administrative process on which our data depend was extended to East Germany in 1991. We want to ensure 
that our decomposition results are not biased due to incorrect information stemming from problems in the 
introductory period of the mandatory retirement system. So, in contrast to the presented descriptive results, we 
decided to use 1993 as base year for our further analysis. However as presented in the descriptive results section 
the mobility trends are robust to an exclusion of 1992.
60 As a robustness check we present the results of the aggregate decomposition with swapped period assignments 
(1 vs. 0) in the appendix B. The results are robust to the direction of the decomposition.
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distinguish the contribution of composition (  ) and structure effects (  ) to the 
overall change in wage mobility over time. In East and West Germany most of the 
change in wage mobility is associated with structural shifts, i.e. with changes in 
correlation patterns and the relevance of unobservables. However, in East Germany 
a statistically significant share of about 40 percent of the total decline in wage 
mobility is associated with composition effects, i.e. with changes in observable 
characteristics. Panel C of Table 5.1 presents the contribution of changes in 
observable characteristics separately for the four groups of explanatory factors. In 
both regions changes in job stability and employment characteristics contributed 
substantially to the composition effect. While in East Germany changes in all 
factor groups contribute to a decline in wage mobility, the shifts in job stability (J ) 
and employment (E ) characteristics in West Germany would have increased wage 
mobility. Surprisingly, the contribution of individual level characteristics (Z ) in East 
Germany is relatively small: if the mobility decline were driven by migration and 
ensuing changes in population characteristics this should have shown up in a more 
substantial contribution of factor group Z to the total composition effect. Instead, 
job stability (J  ) and employment characteristics (E ) appear to be associated most 
strongly with the overall composition effect.
The bottom rows of Table 5.1 describe the magnitude of the approximation 
and the reweighting errors. For East Germany the approximation error to the true 
functional form of the composition effect is negligible, for West Germany it takes 
on a value of -5, which is not large compared to the total change in variance 
between the periods. The reweighting error is statistically significant for East 
Germany. It indicates that there remains a difference between the characteristics 
of the compared groups even after the reweighting procedure.61
Overall, the substantial decline in East German wage mobility is connected to 
both composition and structure effects whereas the small change in West Germany 
can be accounted for by structure effects. In principle, it is possible to decompose 
structure effects and to evaluate the contribution of each factor group. However, 
because the results vary substantially depending on reference group chosen, we 
prefer not to present a – necessarily arbitrary – decomposition of the structure 
effect.
Instead, we refine our decomposition analysis and break the observation 
window in two periods. Figure 5.8 shows that mobility declines non-linearly in 
the two regions. Table 5.2 presents the results of an analysis were the mobility 
decline is compared first for the base years 1993 and 1998 and then, separately, 
for the base years 1998 and 2004 in East and West Germany. Panel A confirms that 
61 The results of the reweighting procedure are described in the appendix B.
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the East German mobility decline slowed down substantially after the first period, 
whereas the West German mobility decline only started after 1998. Indeed, the 
change in the second period was of equal size in East and West while East German 
mobility had already dropped below West German levels in 1998.
Panel B again separates the contributions of structure and composition effects. 
Both contribute significantly to all observed changes. In East Germany, the patterns 
differ for the first and the second period. Whereas in the early period about one 
quarter of the overall mobility change is associated with shifts in characteristics 
that share increases to about more than 60 percent in the second period. In West 
Germany the variance changed little in the first period and in the second period 
the decline is connected to both, composition and structure changes. Across both 
regions and periods the detailed decomposition of the characteristics effect in 
Panel C again yields a dominance of observables that are connected to job stability 
and employment characteristics. In the East, job stability indicators dominate, in 
the West the employment indicators. The approximation and reweighting errors are 
generally small and mostly insignificant in this analysis. Overall, the mobility shifts 
in East and West are associated with both, changes in composition and in structure.
Overall, the results confirm that the change in characteristics of the East 
German labor market drives a substantial share of the decline in wage mobility 
particularly in the second half of the observation window. Job stability and 
employment characteristics may be key determinants of wage mobility in East and 
West Germany. The change in labor force characteristics (Z  ) matters less. Before 
we provide a more detailed discussion of this evidence, we test its robustness.
5.5.2 Two robustness tests
We address two issues in our robustness tests, the impact of Berlin and East-
West migration. More than one fifth of the East German population resides in 
Berlin. Since the labor market in this metropolis may differ substantially from the 
labor markets in the other, at times sparsely populated regions of East Germany 
we investigate whether our findings for East Germany are robust to omitting the 
observations employed in Berlin from the East German sample. Table 5.3 presents 
the results of this exercise. The first two columns show the two sub-periods and the 
final column shows the evidence for the entire observation window.
The descriptive evidence on the drop in wage mobility in Panel A confirms 
the patterns that we observed for all of East Germany in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The 
aggregate decomposition in Panel B confirms that a substantial share of the 
mobility decline is associated with the composition of the sample, particularly in 
the second sub-period. The detailed decomposition in Panel C again shows that job 
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stability and employment characteristics are the factors that contribute most to 
the composition effect. Overall, our results are robust to omitting Berlin.
The second test addresses a sample selection criterion that we imposed on 
the analysis. To ensure that we truly describe the East and West German labor 
markets we required so far that individuals are observed in the same region of the 
country (i.e. east or west) when we measure their wages in periods t and t  +  4. This 
causes a selectivity problem if there is migration, e.g. between the two regions, 
a phenomenon we certainly observed since the early 1990s (see e.g. Brücker and 
Trübswetter, 2007; Hunt, 2006). It is possible that East German wage mobility 
declined because those workers who are mobile with respect to their wage position 
left the region. In that case the East German labor market may not have changed 
at all and our previous results were biased.
To test this scenario, we generated an alternative sample. First, we pooled the 
East and West German observations. Next, we account for the difference in nominal 
wage censoring thresholds between East (low) and West Germany (high): we apply 
the 90th percentile of the East German wage distribution for consistent top coding 
in the full sample. We then ranked the uncensored wage observations in our full 
national sample. For the robustness test, we consider all individuals who work in 
East Germany in base year (t ) of the mobility measurement and describe their 
mobility in the wage distribution by period t  +  4 independent of whether they are 
observed in East or West Germany at that point. This describes the wage mobility 
of East German employees rather than the wage mobility in the East German labor 
market.62 The total number of observations increases from 158,909 considered 
in Table 5.2 to 169,329 in the decomposition analyses for the new sample. The 
development of the variance of the rank change distribution based on the now 
nationally calculated ranks is presented in Appendix Figure 5.13: the patterns for 
the regional groups that stay in East and West Germany for the full observation 
window are similar to those presented in Figure 5.8. When those individuals are 
added to the East German sample who migrate to West Germany by period t  +  4 
the drop in wage mobility is attenuated but remains substantial.
The results of the decomposition exercise based on national ranks and the 
extended East German sample are presented in Table 5.4. The observed variances 
of the rank change distributions in Panel A of Table 5.4 do not differ vastly from 
those in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The overall decline in mobility is reduced from 199.1 
(see Panel A Table 5.1) to 145.11 (see column 3, Panel A, Table 5.4). Panel B shows 
the aggregate decomposition which is fairly similar to that presented in Tables 
62 Eventually, at least 94.1 percent of the initial East German employees are observed to be employed in the East 
German labor market after 4 years. The share of East-West migrants by period t  +  4 ranged from 3.08 percent in 
period 1993–1997, to 5.9 percent in period 1998–2002 and 4.25 percent in 2004–2008.
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5.1 and 5.2, where structure effects dominate particularly in the first period. 
Again composition effects matter particularly in the second period. The share of 
the overall decline that is explained is also fairly similar in both tables. In Table 
5.1 about 40  percent of the overall decline in mobility is explained by observable 
characteristics compared to 47 percent in the extended sample (last column in Table 
5.4). So both, the observed decline in mobility and the substantial contribution of 
observables are robust to changes in sample composition.
The patterns of the detailed decomposition presented in Panel C of Table 
5.4 differ compared to those in Table 5.1. When considering the wage mobility 
of East German employees rather than the East German labor market individual 
characteristics explain a substantial amount of the observed decrease in mobility. 
This is not surprising given that we extended the sample with East-West migrants 
and we know from the literature that these are a highly selective group. However, 
also in the extended sample job stability and employment characteristics are 
important influence factors. Overall, the results in Table 5.4 confirm the robustness 
of prior findings to changes in the sample composition.
5.5.3 Discussion
We have learnt that East German wage mobility was high initially after German 
unification and rapidly fell below West German wage mobility, which also declined 
over time. About 40 percent of the overall East German mobility decline is associated 
with shifts in observables (composition effect) and about 60 percent is connected 
to correlation patterns and unobservables (structure effect). The structure effect 
drives the initial fast drop in wage mobility in the first half of the observed period 
(1993–1998), when the labor market, its matching and remuneration mechanisms 
were to be established. In the second half of the observation period (1998–2004) 
the composition effect dominates in East Germany.
We find that it is not migration or a shift in workforce characteristics, such as 
the age structure, that drive the mobility decline or even the composition effect. 
Instead, changes in job stability and employment characteristics are behind most 
of the composition effect in both periods and both regions of the country. The 
development of job stability indicators (J  ) is summarized in Table 5.5, separately 
by region. These characteristics document the stabilization of the East German 
labor market: the share of individuals changing employers declines to reach West 
Germans levels in 2004. Past unemployment experience still differs between the 
regions, but declined in East Germany. As one might expect, the accumulation of 
job tenure in East Germany took some time but by 2004 the share of employees 
with at least two years of tenure has about reached the West German level. 
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Similarly, the incidence of changes in occupation and industry converged between 
both regions over time.
So, indeed, observable characteristics reflect adjustments in the East German 
labor market, in particular its rising job stability. This, however, does not explain 
why East German wage mobility has fallen below that in West Germany most 
recently. Future research may address this phenomenon.
5.6 Conclusions
This is one of the first studies to apply a large and long-running administrative 
dataset to study the development of wage mobility. We describe the case of 
Germany since the mid 1970s and show that wage mobility in East Germany 
declined continuously since unification. West German wage mobility was initially 
more stable and declined since the late 1990s. We discuss different explanations 
of the observed phenomenon and empirically quantify their contribution to the 
mobility decline using a decomposition procedure that is based on recentered 
influence functions (RIF). The results yield that a substantial part of the mobility 
decline in East Germany is associated with changes in observable characteristics, 
particularly those describing job stability and employment characteristics. However, 
also structural and unexplained factors contributed to the wage mobility decline 
in both parts of Germany.
The ongoing changes in the wage structure in the West German labor market 
suggest that the transition process in the former socialist East German labor market 
cannot be interpreted as a convergence to a static, possibly institution-driven 
West German wage structure. Instead, wage mobility appears to be a dynamic 
characteristic of modern labor markets that develops over time. An important 
conclusion of our analysis is that potential welfare effects of the observed rise in 
wage inequality are not balanced by higher life-time wage mobility, as suggested 
by Friedman (1962), who interpreted mobility as an equalizer of long-term incomes. 
Instead, inequality continues to rise at the same time as its potential balancing 
mechanism – wage mobility – loses effectiveness.
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5.7 Figures and tables
 
Figure 5.1:  Development of percentiles of the real wage distribution by region
200
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Note:  all figures present the 20th (P20), 50th (P50), and 80th (P80) percentile of the distribution of daily 
real wages separately in West and East Germany. In addition, the censoring threshold for insurance 
contributions (cen. thresh.) is depicted.
Source: SIAB (1975-2008).
  cen. thresh.   P80   P50   P20 
re
al
 d
ai
ly
 w
ag
e
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
East Germany
200
150
100
50
  cen. thresh.   P80   P50   P20 
re
al
 d
ai
ly
 w
ag
e
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
West Germany
89Chapter 5
Figures and tables
 Figure 5.2:  Development of real daily wage inequality in East and West Germany:  
Gini coefficients and mean log deviation (MLD)
Note: the measures are calculated for the uncensored part of the distribution of real daily wages only.
Source: SIAB (1975-2008).
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Figure 5.3:  Development of quintile transition probabilities by region
Note:  all figures present the probability of a transition from a given quintile in the quintile transition matrix 
of year t (x-axis) to year t + 4. Rank positions and transition matrices are calculated based on separate 
East and West German wage distributions in each year (t and t + 4). The graphs indicate the probability 
of staying in a given quintile, of jumping by one, two, three, or four quintiles. Upward and downward 
mobility are not distinguished. All observations – including censored observations – are considered.
Source: SIAB (1975-2008).
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Figure 5.4:  Development of the probability of a change in rank position by more than  
10 points between t and t + 4
Note: calculated using rank distributions based only on uncensored observations.
Source: SIAB (1975–2008).
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Figure 5.5:  Distribution of changes in relative rank positions - by period and region
Note:  individual rank positions are determined based on the regional wage distribution in both, the beginning and 
the end years of the considered intervals. Since not all wage earners of the base year are observed four years 
later, and because those with stable employment situations may represent a positive selection, we obtain 
slightly more upward than downward mobility in rank positions. Censored wage observations are omitted. 
Because all censored individuals occupy the same rank, their consideration would vastly increase the share of 
zero changes in rank position. Alternative depictions including censored wage observations are available upon 
request.
Source: SIAB (1975–2008).
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Figure 5.6:  Development of correlation coefficients for individual percentile ranks
Note:  these figures describe correlation coefficients at the individual level measured based on subsequent base 
years (x-axis). The correlation coefficients were calculated including the wages of censored observations. 
Since the last year of observed data is 2008 we cannot calculate more recent correlations so far.
Source: SIAB (1975–2008).
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Figure 5.7:  Development of Shorrocks indices based on mean log deviation (MLD) and  
Gini coefficients for regional subsamples
Note:  all values are calculated for an accounting period of five years (i.e. years t – t + 4). The calculations use 
only the uncensored part of the wage distribution. Indicators labeled “mld” present the Shorrocks Index 
when using a mean log deviation inequality measure. Indicators labeled “gini” are based on the Gini 
coefficient as an inequality measure.
Source: SIAB (1975–2008).
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Figure 5.8:  Development of annual mean values of dependent variable by region
Note:  the dependent variable of the empirical decomposition analyses describes the individual contribution 
to the variance of the distribution of individual rank changes in the annual wage distributions between 
periods t (on the x-axis) and t + 4.
Source: SIAB (1975–2008).
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Table 5.1: Decomposition results – full period
period 1 1993–1997 1993–1997
period 0 2004–2008 2004–2008
East West
A. Description
period 1 390.19 *** 265.70 ***
2.90 1.40
period 0 191.09 *** 224.39 ***
2.78 1.46
change –199.10 *** –41.31 ***
4.09 2.12
B. Aggregate Decomposition
composition –80.25 *** 2.00
5.16 1.97
structure –138.97 *** –37.62 ***
6.27 2.12
C. Detailed Decomposition
Z – individual –13.37 *** –6.03 ***
3.80 0.82
J – job stability –32.55 *** 2.31 ***
2.61 0.78
E – employment –33.08 *** 5.83 ***
3.09 1.10
R – regional –1.25 *** –0.12
0.40 0.10
approximation error 0.94 –5.31 **
9.20 2.16
reweighting error 19.18 *** –0.38
4.45 0.78
Note:  Z, J, E, and R represent the groups of individual, job stability, employment and regional variables, which 
contain different numbers of indicators as described in the text and data appendix. The figures present 
absolute values of mobility and its changes. The figures in italics are bootstrapped standard errors  
(100 replications). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively. The analysis is based on the consistently censored part of the daily wage distribution. 
Number of observations: East Germany 1993–1997: 60,676; East Germany 2004–2008: 46,341; West 
Germany 1993–1997: 189,533; West Germany 2004–2008: 184,846. 
Source: SIAB (1975–2008). 
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Table 5.2: Decomposition results – partial periods
period 1 1993–1997 1998–2002 1993–1997 1998–2002
period 0 1998–2002 2004–2008 1998–2002 2004–2008
East West
A. Description
period 1 390.19 *** 238.61 *** 265.70 *** 272.78 ***
3.12 2.78 1.54 1.51
period 0 238.61 *** 191.09 *** 272.78 *** 224.39 ***
2.90 2.58 1.71 1.23
change –151.58 *** –47.52 *** 7.08 *** –48.39 ***
4.41 4.11 2.44 1.79
B. Aggregate Decomposition
composition –36.57 *** –33.09 *** 17.86 *** –19.26 ***
2.94 3.66 1.44 1.81
structure –113.54 *** –21.45 *** –8.57 *** –26.21 ***
4.48 4.53 2.29 2.20
C. Detailed Decomposition
composition –36.57 *** –33.09 *** 17.86 *** –19.26 ***
2.94 3.66 1.44 1.81
Z – individual –7.44 *** –8.71 *** –4.85 *** –4.83 ***
1.18 2.22 0.52 0.50
J – job stability –17.63 *** –12.28 *** 10.63 *** –7.00 ***
1.69 1.61 0.72 0.90
E – employment –10.82 *** –11.91 *** 12.17 *** –7.37 ***
1.80 2.21 1.07 1.07
R – regional –0.67 * –0.19 –0.09 –0.05
0.38 0.24 0.09 0.09
approximation error –1.85 –0.02 –4.03 * –1.77
5.17 5.23 2.28 1.96
reweighting error 0.37 7.05 *** 1.82 ** –1.16
1.62 1.92 0.76 0.94
Notes:  see Table 5.1. Number of observations: East Germany 1993–1997: 60,676; East Germany 1998–2002: 
51,892; East Germany 2004–2008: 46,341; West Germany 1993–1997: 189,533; West Germany  
1998–2002: 187,681; West Germany 2004–2008: 184,846.
Source: SIAB (1975–2008).
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Table 5.3: Decomposition results – robustness test 1: drop Berlin
period 1 1993–1997 1998–2002 1993–1997
period 0 1998–2002 2004–2008 2004–2008
East Germany
A. Description
period 1 380.32 *** 225.13 *** 380.32 ***
3.31 2.47 3.38
period 0 225.13 *** 180.95 *** 180.95 ***
2.59 2.63 2.93
change –155.19 *** –44.18 *** –199.37 ***
4.18 3.63 4.40
B. Aggregate Decomposition
composition –38.80 *** –30.17 *** –79.39 ***
2.98 3.56 7.28
structure –113.08 *** –20.77 *** –137.63 ***
4.78 4.45 6.89
C. Detailed Decomposition
composition –38.80 *** –30.17 *** –79.39 ***
2.98 3.56 7.28
Z – individual –6.88 *** –6.76 *** –9.55 **
1.13 1.88 4.46
J – job stability –19.23 *** –11.99 *** –34.37 ***
1.66 1.88 3.03
E – employment –12.71 *** –11.43 *** –35.57 ***
1.75 2.02 4.32
R – regional 0.02 0.01 0.08
0.18 0.11 0.16
approximation error –2.34 –0.21 –4.54
6.16 5.45 11.38
reweighting error –0.96 6.96 *** 22.19 ***
1.73 1.85 7.12
Notes:  see Table 5.1. Observations employed in Berlin in period t are omitted from the sample.  
Number of observations: 1993–1997: 51,332; 1998–2002: 43,803; 2004–2008: 39,100.
Source: SIAB (1975–2008).
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Table 5.4: Decomposition results – robustness test 2: national ranks and extended sample
period 1 1993–1997 1998–2002 1993–1997
period 0 1998–2002 2004–2008 2004–2008
East Germany
A. Description
period 1 340.12 *** 243.52 *** 340.12 ***
2.85 2.98 2.32
period 0 243.52 *** 195.01 *** 195.01 ***
2.98 2.79 2.74
change -96.60 *** -48.51 *** -145.11 ***
4.28 4.23 3.70
B. Aggregate Decomposition
composition -25.26 *** -38.38 *** -68.92 ***
2.76 2.98 4.87
structure -71.28 *** -13.48 *** -82.94 ***
4.35 4.31 5.61
C. Detailed Decomposition
composition -25.26 *** -38.38 *** -68.92 ***
2.76 2.98 4.87
Z – individual -7.07 *** -21.35 *** -30.43 ***
1.51 2.04 2.35
J – job stability -13.18 *** -11.37 *** -22.37 ***
1.34 1.51 2.34
E – employment -4.28 *** -5.66 *** -14.64 ***
1.47 1.90 3.09
R – regional -0.73 ** 0.00 -1.48 ***
0.30 0.27 0.43
approximation error -1.38 -0.19 -3.30
5.29 5.23 7.02
reweighting error 1.32 3.53 * 10.04 ***
1.53 2.04 3.42
Notes:  see Table 5.1. The ranks were calculated for the pooled East and West German wage distribution.  
The decomposition is performed for those observations, who are employed in East Germany in  
the base period t independent of where they are employed in period t  + 4. Number of observations  
1993–1997: 65,292; 1998–2002: 54,999; 2004–2008: 49,038.
Source: SIAB (1975–2008).
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Table 5.5: Job and employment characteristics by region and year 
(J) (E)
Firm Unemployment Exp. Tenure Occu pation Industry
Change none < 0.5 yr < 1 yr > 1 yr > 2 yrs Change Change
East
1993 0.48 0.66 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.53 0.23 0.24
1998 0.38 0.69 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.63 0.17 0.18
2004 0.32 0.70 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.70 0.13 0.13
West
1993 0.29 0.81 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.74 0.13 0.13
1998 0.34 0.82 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.69 0.14 0.14
2004 0.30 0.80 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.74 0.12 0.13
Notes: average values for full sample observed in base years 1993, 1998 and 2004.
Source: SIAB (1975–2008). 
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5.9 Appendix A
Table 5.6: Number of annual observations in full sample and in mobility analyses
West Germany East Germany
Year t t & t  +  4 t & t  +  4 t t & t  +  4 t & t  +  4
abs. in % abs. in %
1975 229,173 171,123 0.75
1976 229,826 172,463 0.75
1977 233,020 174,423 0.75
1978 233,252 171,417 0.73
1979 240,586 172,122 0.72
1980 242,998 171,930 0.71
1981 243,737 170,963 0.70
1982 240,919 172,945 0.72
1983 236,286 171,147 0.72
1984 237,829 173,507 0.73
1985 236,028 172,254 0.73
1986 242,790 177,151 0.73
1987 245,336 178,227 0.73
1988 249,548 180,022 0.72
1989 256,878 182,117 0.71
1990 269,878 184,992 0.69
1991 280,101 189,907 0.68
1992 283,999 191,013 0.67 98,967 64,419 0.65
1993 281,241 189,906 0.68 94,949 62,431 0.66
1994 276,411 189,413 0.69 93,100 60,941 0.65
1995 275,693 191,082 0.69 92,450 60,548 0.65
1996 271,929 191,855 0.71 89,918 58,687 0.65
1997 268,761 189,956 0.71 85,320 55,406 0.65
1998 268,893 188,040 0.70 82,641 53,105 0.64
1999 270,074 187,241 0.69 81,224 52,033 0.64
2000 273,463 188,047 0.69 78,512 50,028 0.64
2001 272,230 187,394 0.69 75,368 47,961 0.64
2002 265,904 186,372 0.70 71,997 46,884 0.65
2003 259,578 186,538 0.72 69,426 46,934 0.68
2004 253,159 184,855 0.73 66,771 46,343 0.69
Note:  the columns entitled “t ” provide the number of sample observations observed in the base period (calendar 
year provided in “Year” column). The columns entitled “t & t + 4” provide the number of observations (“abs”) 
with wage observations in periods t and t  + 4 as well as their share (“in %”) in the number of observations 
in the base period.
Source: SIAB (1975–2008). 
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Figure 5.9:  Changes in real wages
(i) West Germany – base year 1975
(ii) West and East Germany - base year 1992
Source: SIAB (1975-2008).
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Source: SIAB (1975–2008)
Figure 5.10:  Development of the spread between 80th and 20th percentile of the real wage 
distribution
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Figure 5.11:  Development of mean absolute change in real wages
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Note: only developments for the uncensored part of the daily wage distribution are described.
Source: SIAB (1975–2008).
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Figure 5.12: Development of mean relative change in real wages
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Source: SIAB (1975–2008).
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Figure 5.13:  Variances of rank change distribution based on national ranks
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Note:  the “only West” and “only East” patterns describes the aggregate mobility patterns for those individuals 
who are observed in the same region of the country in periods t and t + 4 only now using nationwide 
rank assignments. The “East including migrants to West” extends the East German sample by the group of 
migrants that was not considered in the main analyses.
Source: SIAB (1975–2008).
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5.10 Data appendix
This data appendix provides a detailed description of the variables used in the 
decomposition analyses. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 present descriptive statistics as of the 
three base years (t) considered in the mobility analyses, 1993, 1998, and 2004. All 
information is collected for the base year t.
Wage measure
Our data provide employment spells. We are interested in wages of full-time 
employment relationships, only. If several simultaneous full-time employment 
relationships are reported for a given person over the course of a calendar year 
we consider the wage of the main job. The main job is the one with the longest 
spell duration or –if several employment relationships have the same duration– the 
highest daily wages.63 Since we are interested in wage mobility in the main job we 
do not consider information on secondary jobs. We use a daily wage observation for 
every individual that was full-time employed at least one day in a given year. The 
daily wage is measured in 2008 prices.
Wage observations are censored at the contribution limit of the mandatory 
retirement system. This upper threshold varies by year and by region (i.e. east and 
west). To ensure that we observe a constant share of the wage distribution in both 
regions we apply a consistent top-coding approach (Burkhauser et al., 2009). In 
detail, we censor the regional wage distribution at the highest percentile that can 
be observed uncensored in all years. For West Germany this is the 85th percentile 
and for East Germany this is the 90th percentile.
The data contain two structural breaks. A first one occurs in 1984: since 
1984 one-time payments such as bonuses are added to the earnings data. While 
various authors who study wages or inequality with our data correct for this 
break using a method developed by Fitzenberger (1999) we omit this adjustment 
for two reasons: first, it is unlikely that the addition of bonuses to the upper 
parts of the wage distribution affects rank positions and mobility, and second 
the correction does not provide imputations for individuals observed only prior 
to 1984. However, as our main analysis focuses on the period after 1992 it is 
not affected by this structural break. The data contain a second structural break, 
as after 1999 minor employment was registered with the retirement insurance. 
63 On average about 15 percent of the employees in our sample experienced more than one full-time employment 
spell over the course of the year. By considering the wage of a “main job” we differ from the procedure applied by 
Dustmann et al. (2009), who use the average wage of all full-time employment relationships in a given calendar 
year.
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However, since we condition on full-time employment this should not affect our 
results.
Wage ranks
The main variable in our mobility analysis is the change in the individual’s rank 
in the wage distribution between two years t and t  +  k. To obtain this change, 
we first define the rank in the wage distribution. For a given year t, we divide 
the uncensored part of the wage distribution (up to the 85th percentile in West 
Germany and up to the 90th percentile in East Germany) into 100 percentiles. We 
now assign each individual with an uncensored wage observation one of these 
100  ranks for this year. We repeat the same procedure for year t  + k to calculate the 
individual wage rank in year t  + k. The resulting difference between these two ranks 
is our measure of the individual’s wage mobility. The variance of the distribution 
of these individual rank changes is our main aggregate measure of wage mobility 
which we interpret as a characteristic of the regional labor market.
Individual characteristics Z
Education: the data contain information on the education of the individual which 
we divide into three categories. We classify individuals to be low educated if 
they have no degree at all or if they finished school (without university entrance 
certificate) but did not complete vocational training. An individual is medium 
educated if the person finished school and vocational training or if the person 
holds a university entrance degree but does not hold a university degree. Finally, 
individuals holding a university degree are classified as high educated (for a similar 
classification see Dustmann et al., 2009). As the data show many missing values 
for the education variable, we imputed education according to the procedure 
suggested by Fitzenberger et al. (2006).64
Age: we use six age categories: (1) 25–30, (2) 31–35, (3) 36–40, (4) 41–45, (5)  46–50, 
and (6) > 50 years. As we analyze a five year period and age is measured in the start 
year t, the highest age in the last category is 56. Otherwise, the individual would be 
above age 60 in period t  +  4 which would violate our age restriction.
Starting position: we control for the individual’s rank position in the wage 
distribution in the start year. The variable considers ten categories according to the 
10 deciles of the uncensored part of the wage distribution.
64 Fitzenberger et al. (2006) suggest a number of different imputation rules. We apply the procedure describes as IP1 
in their paper.
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Citizenship: indicator variable (= 1) if person is not of German citizenship.
Sex: indicator variable (= 1) if person is female.
Migrates west (mw): indicator variable (= 1) if person migrates to West Germany 
in the future. This information is only calculated for the East German sample.
Job stability J
Firm change: indicator variable (=1) if individual changes employers between t 
and t  + 4.
Unemployment: we control for individuals’ unemployment experience in the 
five year period between t and t  +  4. We consider an individual as unemployed 
if the person is observed to receive unemployment benefits (this includes short 
term as well as long term unemployment).65 We consider four categories: (1) No 
unemployment experience, (2) up to half a year of unemployment experience, 
(3)  more than half a year but less than 1 year of unemployment experience, (4) 
more than 1 year of unemployment experience.
Tenure: tenure is measured in four categories: (1) less than half a year, (2) between 
half a year and one year, (3) between one and two years, (4) more than two years.
Employer and employment characteristics E
Firm size: we include six categories of firm size: (1) up to 10 employees, (2) between 
10 and 25 employees, (3) 25 to 50 employees, (4) 51 to 100 employees, (5) 101 to 
1000 employees, (6) more than 1000 employees.
Sector: we control for 9 sectors: (1) agriculture, (2) energy, water supply and mining, 
(3) manufacturing, (4) construction, (5) retail, (6) transport and telecommunication, 
(7) banking and insurance, (8) services, (9) administration, non-profit organizations 
and private households.
Decreasing workforce (dw): indicator variable (= 1) if an individual’s employer 
reduces the number of employees between t and t  +  4.
Occupational category: we control for 11 occupational categories (according 
to Blossfeld, 1985): (1) simple manual occupation, (2) qualified manual 
occupations, (3) technicians and engineers, (4) simple services, (5) qualified 
services, (6) semi professions, (7) professions, (8) simple sales and administration 
occupations, (9)  qualified sales and administration occupations, (10) manager, 
(11)  miscellaneous.
65 Note that this definition excludes individuals that are unemployed but for any reason do not receive unemployment 
benefits.
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Sector change: indicator variable (= 1) if individual changes sector between t and 
t  + 4.
Occupation change: indicator variable (= 1) if individual changes occupational 
category between t and t  + 4.
Regional information R
State indicators: indicator variables controlling for the federal state (Bundesland) 
of the individual’s workplace.
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Table 5.7: Descriptive statistics of the East German sample
base year base year base year difference difference difference
1993 1998 2004
A B C C – A B – A C – B
Z
age
25–30 0.21 0.16 0.12 –0.09 –0.05 –0.04
31–35 0.20 0.19 0.14 –0.06 –0.01 –0.05
36–40 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.00 0.02 –0.02
41–45 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.06 0.03 0.03
46–50 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.07 0.04 0.03
> 50 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.03 –0.02 0.05
start position
1–10 0.08 0.08 0.07 –0.01 0.00 –0.01
11–20 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.00 –0.01 0.01
21–30 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.01
31–40 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
41–50 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
51–60 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
61–70 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
71–80 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.00
81–90 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.00
91–100 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.00
education
low 0.06 0.03 0.03 –0.03 –0.02 –0.01
medium 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.01 0.01 0.00
high 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.01
citizenship
non–German 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
sex
female 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.00 0.00 –0.01
migrates west
mw = 1 0.08 0.05 0.01 –0.07 –0.03 –0.04
J
firm change
fc = 1 0.48 0.38 0.32 –0.16 –0.10 –0.06
unemployment
not unemployed 0.66 0.69 0.70 0.04 0.03 0.01
0–0.5 year 0.15 0.12 0.10 –0.05 –0.03 –0.02
0.5–1 year 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
> 1 year 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.01
tenure
< 0.5 year 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.5–1 year 0.18 0.16 0.10 –0.08 –0.02 –0.06
1–2 years 0.22 0.14 0.14 –0.08 –0.07 –0.01
> 2 years 0.53 0.63 0.70 0.17 0.10 0.07
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base year base year base year difference difference difference
1993 1998 2004
A B C C – A B – A C – B
E
firm size (no. of employees)
1–10 0.17 0.21 0.20 0.03 0.04 –0.01
11–25 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.00
26–50 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.01
51–100 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.02 0.01 0.01
101–1000 0.33 0.29 0.30 –0.03 –0.05 0.02
> 1000 0.14 0.09 0.07 –0.07 –0.05 –0.02
sector
agriculture 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02
energy, w. s. & m. 0.03 0.02 0.01 –0.01 –0.01 0.00
manufacturing 0.23 0.24 0.22 –0.01 0.00 –0.02
construction 0.15 0.14 0.12 –0.03 –0.01 –0.03
retail 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.01
transport & telecom. 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
banking and insurance 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
services 0.21 0.25 0.33 0.11 0.04 0.07
adm., non-profit and p.h. 0.17 0.13 0.07 –0.09 –0.04 –0.05
decreasing workforce
dw = 1 0.71 0.61 0.55 –0.16 –0.10 –0.05
occupational category
simple manual 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.01 0.00 0.02
qualified manual 0.22 0.21 0.19 –0.03 0.00 –0.02
tech. and engineers 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
simple services 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.00 –0.01 0.00
qualified services 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00
semi professions 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
professions 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
simp. sales a. adm. 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.00 –0.01
qual. sales a. adm. 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
manager 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
miscellaneous 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
occ. change
oc = 1 0.23 0.17 0.13 –0.09 –0.06 –0.03
sector change
sc = 1 0.24 0.18 0.13 –0.11 –0.06 –0.05
R
Berlin 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00
Brandenburg 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00
Meck.–West Pom. 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
Saxony 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00
Saxony–Anhalt 0.17 0.17 0.16 –0.01 0.00 –0.01
Thuringia 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.01
Note:  the table contains the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used in the decomposition 
analyses. 
Source: SIAB (1975–2008).     
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Table 5.8: Descriptive statistics of the West German sample
base year base year base year difference difference difference
1993 1998 2004
A B C C – A B – A C – B
Z
age
25–30 0.27 0.22 0.16 –0.11 –0.06 –0.05
31–35 0.19 0.21 0.16 –0.03 0.02 –0.05
36–40 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.04 0.03 0.01
41–45 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.05 0.01 0.04
46–50 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.04 0.02 0.02
> 50 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.00 –0.03 0.03
start position
1–10 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
11–20 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
21–30 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
31–40 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
41–50 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
51–60 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
61–70 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
71–80 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
81–90 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
91–100 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
education
low 0.16 0.13 0.11 –0.05 –0.03 –0.02
medium 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.02 0.01 0.01
high 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.02
citizenship
non–German 0.10 0.09 0.08 –0.02 –0.01 –0.01
sex
female 0.33 0.33 0.33 –0.01 –0.01 0.00
J
firm change
fc = 1 0.29 0.34 0.30 0.00 0.04 –0.04
unemployment
not unemployed 0.81 0.82 0.80 –0.01 0.00 –0.01
0–0.5 year 0.09 0.09 0.08 –0.01 0.00 –0.01
0.5–1 year 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01
> 1 year 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.02
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base year base year base year difference difference difference
1993 1998 2004
A B C C – A B – A C – B
tenure
< 0.5 year 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.01 –0.01
0.5–1 year 0.10 0.12 0.08 –0.02 0.02 –0.04
1–2 years 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.00
> 2 years 0.74 0.69 0.74 0.01 –0.04 0.05
E
firm size (no. of employees)
1–10 0.17 0.19 0.15 –0.03 0.02 –0.05
11–25 0.12 0.13 0.13 –0.01 0.00 –0.01
26–50 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.01
51–100 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.01
101–1000 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.02 –0.01 0.02
> 1000 0.16 0.14 0.13 –0.04 –0.03 –0.01
sector
agriculture 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
energy, w. s. & m. 0.02 0.02 0.01 –0.01 0.00 0.00
manufacturing 0.40 0.38 0.33 –0.07 –0.02 –0.05
construction 0.08 0.08 0.08 –0.01 –0.01 0.00
retail 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.01
transport & telecom. 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.01
banking and insurance 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
services 0.19 0.22 0.27 0.08 0.03 0.05
adm., non–profit and p.h. 0.08 0.08 0.06 –0.03 –0.01 –0.02
decreasing workforce
dw = 1 0.65 0.44 0.53 –0.12 –0.21 0.08
occupational category
simple manual 0.23 0.22 0.21 –0.02 –0.01 –0.01
qualified manual 0.23 0.22 0.20 –0.03 –0.01 –0.02
tech. and engineers 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00
simple services 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
qualified services 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00
semi professions 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01
professions 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
simp. sales a. adm. 0.07 0.07 0.06 –0.01 0.00 –0.01
qual. sales a. adm. 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.02 0.01 0.01
manager 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
occ. change
oc = 1 0.13 0.14 0.12 –0.01 0.01 –0.02
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base year base year base year difference difference difference
1993 1998 2004
A B C C – A B – A C – B
sector change
sc = 1 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.01 –0.02
R
Schleswig-Holstein 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hamburg 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lower Saxony 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bremen 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hesse 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
Baden-Württemberg 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bavaria 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00
Saarland 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: the table contains the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used in the decomposition
Source: SIAB (1975–2008).     
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Table 5.11: RIF regressions for East and West Germany
East Germany                             West Germany
1993         1998          2004          1993          1998          2004
age cat. 2 –28.45 ** –69.23 *** –48.83 *** –60.73 *** –92.68 *** –71.08 ***
–2.91 –7.74 –4.84 –13.46 –19.04 –14.07
age cat. 3 –41.51 *** –98.63 *** –88.65 *** –81.57 *** –123.30 *** –101.00 ***
–4.14 –11.12 –9.34 –16.90 –24.32 –20.77
age cat. 4 –64.79 *** –106.80 *** –98.68 *** –89.33 *** –129.80 *** –115.10 ***
–6.17 –11.69 –10.57 –17.96 –24.22 –23.27
age cat. 5 –70.22 *** –115.20 *** –101.40 *** –92.18 *** –131.70 *** –108.90 ***
–6.08 –12.07 –10.53 –16.98 –23.57 –20.88
age cat. 6 –98.47 *** –101.20 *** –109.20 *** –91.07 *** –114.80 *** –103.30 ***
–8.77 –9.58 –10.98 –17.20 –18.39 –18.80
pos. 2 26.16 –61.50 *** –17.43 12.87 –17.31 * –21.70 **
1.69 –4.58 –1.33 1.72 –2.22 –3.04
pos. 3 47.57 ** –71.53 *** –18.31 84.59 *** –9.13 –5.21
3.05 –5.43 –1.41 11.25 –1.17 –0.73
pos. 4 67.78 *** –87.90 *** –15.38 101.70 *** 2.09 20.03 **
4.35 –6.60 –1.17 13.40 0.26 2.78
pos. 5 96.11 *** –56.26 *** 3.59 129.90 *** 17.81 * 45.86 ***
6.09 –4.22 0.27 16.91 2.23 6.26
pos. 6 109.70 *** –14.41 43.75 ** 133.00 *** 19.67 * 55.61 ***
6.88 –1.07 3.28 17.11 2.43 7.51
pos. 7 120.50 *** –3.40 54.38 *** 152.90 *** 26.17 ** 72.22 ***
7.44 –0.25 4.00 19.40 3.20 9.61
pos. 8 162.00 *** 10.15 51.97 *** 159.10 *** 27.36 ** 61.01 ***
9.75 0.73 3.74 19.95 3.29 8.00
pos. 9 147.70 *** –8.27 30.12 * 173.90 *** 29.16 *** 32.95 ***
8.68 –0.58 2.12 21.30 3.41 4.20
pos. 10 146.00 *** –42.52 ** 38.32 * 203.70 *** 36.48 *** 33.52 ***
7.99 –2.79 2.54 23.26 4.03 3.98
educ mid 16.37 11.39 31.55 29.70 *** 35.88 *** 33.72 ***
1.16 0.76 1.92 6.42 6.97 6.80
educ high 18.22 52.03 ** 84.23 *** 94.25 *** 162.70 *** 130.20 ***
0.97 2.89 4.48 9.42 17.03 16.12
non-German 104.00 *** 23.88 –41.85 35.30 *** 19.74 *** –5.05
3.86 0.96 –1.64 6.71 3.36 –0.91
sex –46.23 *** –29.30 *** –1.95 4.42 –21.07 *** 11.27 **
–5.40 –4.13 –0.29 1.06 –4.92 2.97
migrates west 43.56 *** 68.50 *** 30.05 – – –
3.73 5.68 1.10
firm change 125.70 *** 156.50 *** 133.30 *** 167.90 *** 177.80 *** 169.70 ***
15.27 21.12 18.32 38.76 39.25 39.86
unempl. cat. 2 126.20 *** 86.04 *** 106.70 *** 113.00 *** 68.17 *** 93.95 ***
12.77 9.28 11.35 19.72 11.47 16.12
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East Germany                             West Germany
1993         1998          2004          1993          1998          2004
unempl. cat. 3 217.50 *** 142.80 *** 153.10 *** 164.30 *** 72.26 *** 137.80 ***
16.92 12.51 14.00 21.35 8.85 19.37
unempl. cat. 4 265.30 *** 149.80 *** 139.60 *** 240.20 *** 57.93 *** 90.33 ***
21.93 13.82 14.29 31.17 6.97 12.95
tenure cat. 2 –29.91 * –62.01 *** –59.21 *** –93.60 *** –156.70 *** –87.10 ***
–2.05 –5.11 –4.61 –11.33 –19.88 –10.98
tenure cat. 3 6.03 –25.03 * –55.41 *** –90.93 *** –174.60 *** –87.62 ***
0.42 –1.98 –4.44 –11.05 –21.70 –11.52
tenure cat. 4 –24.63 –31.91 ** –74.56 *** –133.30 *** –209.30 *** –117.80 ***
–1.75 –2.77 –6.53 –17.96 –28.80 –16.97
firm size class 2 –22.90 16.08 –12.14 –4.05 8.00 2.20
–1.95 1.78 –1.38 –0.71 1.38 0.41
firm size class 3 –35.67 ** 22.36 * 12.95 –0.11 9.73 19.83 ***
–2.87 2.31 1.40 –0.02 1.58 3.47
firm size class 4 –22.59 34.40 *** 7.45 0.58 20.83 *** 13.84 *
–1.82 3.53 0.80 0.10 3.40 2.44
firm size class 5 –17.15 17.06 * 26.69 ** –13.90 ** 12.84 * 20.67 ***
–1.63 2.01 3.23 –2.75 2.51 4.20
firm size class 6 23.48 –41.29 *** –8.85 –37.77 *** 3.86 32.44 ***
1.77 –3.44 –0.69 –6.17 0.60 5.19
sec1 –97.80 *** –105.40 *** –52.76 ** –109.30 *** –138.20 *** –107.40 ***
–3.33 –4.34 –3.27 –6.07 –7.39 –7.16
sec2 173.10 *** –6.54 –43.44 –38.90 ** –45.72 *** –0.96
8.06 –0.30 –1.93 –3.23 –3.45 –0.08
sec3 156.80 *** –0.99 –1.89 17.13 ** –15.91 ** 13.61 **
14.57 –0.11 –0.22 3.27 –3.00 2.91
sec4 61.30 *** –5.43 –54.18 *** 2.35 –18.34 * –30.79 ***
4.87 –0.50 –5.17 0.33 –2.41 –4.59
sec5 47.58 *** –9.32 –8.41 –20.44 *** –39.51 *** –27.56 ***
3.60 –0.87 –0.87 –3.40 –6.52 –5.35
sec6 –61.59 *** –29.13 ** –29.42 ** –38.46 *** –32.78 *** –34.78 ***
–4.54 –2.61 –2.76 –5.07 –4.25 –5.24
sec7 85.56 ** 15.33 16.78 –24.24 * –44.47 *** 0.30
3.13 0.70 0.73 –2.39 –4.21 0.03
sec9 –83.84 *** –66.74 *** –76.69 *** –66.32 *** –97.64 *** –71.68 ***
–7.69 –6.84 –6.84 –10.15 –14.29 –10.36
negative dev. –23.70 ** –39.87 *** –31.97 *** –19.12 *** –23.87 *** –32.43 ***
–3.01 –6.61 –5.78 –5.73 –6.92 –10.79
occupation 2 –20.91 * 11.92 8.19 –17.15 *** –4.02 –9.83 *
–2.04 1.37 0.95 –3.64 –0.80 –2.08
occupation 3 0.24 49.31 *** 15.53 –6.59 25.27 ** 18.23 *
0.01 3.57 1.19 –0.84 3.15 2.54
occupation 4 54.22 *** 33.53 ** 0.95 18.12 ** 4.53 –14.51 **
4.42 3.12 0.09 3.19 0.75 –2.61
occupation 5 81.22 *** 46.05 ** 22.43 4.67 –9.00 –7.63
4.61 3.14 1.62 0.49 –0.93 –0.89
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East Germany                             West Germany
1993         1998          2004          1993          1998          2004
occupation 6 100.00 *** 58.66 *** 41.57 ** 24.56 ** 26.44 ** 28.95 ***
5.89 4.14 3.04 2.63 2.81 3.52
occupation 7 48.55 104.30 *** 31.62 176.90 *** 234.50 *** 265.90 ***
1.44 3.71 1.25 9.45 13.12 18.06
occupation 8 65.36 *** 51.45 *** 35.05 ** 36.59 *** 45.47 *** 21.26 **
4.00 3.78 2.63 4.96 5.77 2.91
occupation 9 107.20 *** 99.03 *** 72.26 *** 99.14 *** 132.10 *** 76.44 ***
8.26 8.95 6.90 16.42 20.93 13.57
occupation 10 137.70 *** 125.10 *** 67.96 *** 157.80 *** 208.90 *** 137.90 ***
6.04 6.35 3.51 10.45 13.84 10.95
occupation 11 –35.28 44.44 –13.15 20.02 117.70 ** 26.05
–0.96 1.11 –0.38 0.25 2.79 1.08
occ. change 151.50 *** 153.90 *** 169.60 *** 169.30 *** 182.30 *** 170.40 ***
17.79 18.69 19.57 33.00 34.96 33.39
sector change 180.00 *** 175.70 *** 177.10 *** 155.60 *** 168.40 *** 211.00 ***
20.18 20.61 19.14 28.75 30.11 40.05
state1 69.57 *** 77.89 *** 44.67 *** – – –
5.72 7.74 4.69
state2 20.05 –1.35 –7.65 – – –
1.75 –0.14 –0.83
state3 –5.25 –32.83 ** –17.39 – – –
–0.42 –3.08 –1.69
state4 11.17 8.09 –2.35 – – –
1.11 0.96 –0.29
state5 –19.53 –8.19 –8.20 – – –
–1.75 –0.87 –0.90
state6 – – – 11.79 34.11 ** 39.41 ***
1.02 2.78 3.51
state7 – – – –8.02 –3.71 –17.91 *
–0.89 –0.39 –2.09
state8 – – – 2.47 9.73 –35.86 *
0.16 0.60 –2.42
state9 – – – 11.89 21.83 * 3.92
1.43 2.51 0.49
state10 – – – 8.12 13.98 10.71
0.88 1.44 1.21
state11 – – – 4.55 2.51 –6.90
0.45 0.24 –0.72
state12 – – – 10.97 21.61 * 4.95
1.27 2.38 0.60
state13 – – – –4.97 5.57 –6.51
–0.58 0.62 –0.80
state14 – – – 19.06 1.85 –10.75
1.42 0.13 –0.84
constant 88.09 *** 200.10 *** 155.70 *** 172.30 *** 362.10 *** 216.10 ***
3.32 8.24 6.26 12.44 25.55 16.24
N 60,676 51,892 46,341 189,533 187,681 184,846
R-sq 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11
Note: t-statistics in italics; *, **, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 5, 1 and .1 percent level.
Source: SIAB (1975–2008).
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Table 5.12: Decomposition results – robustness test: swapping t = 0 and t = 1
period 1 1993–1997 1993–1997
period 0 2004–2008 2004–2008
East West
A. Description
period 1 390.19 *** 265.70 ***
3.30 1.58
period 0 191.09 *** 224.39 ***
2.44 1.38
change –199.10 *** –41.31 ***
4.10 1.98
B. Aggregate Decomposition
composition –66.75 *** –0.17
3.73 2.14
structure –135.33 *** –39.20 ***
3.66 2.26
C. Detailed Decomposition
composition –66.75 *** –0.17
3.73 2.14
Z – individual –10.52 *** –9.10 ***
1.49 1.01
J – job stability –28.40 *** 3.81 ***
2.13 1.07
E – employment –29.30 *** 5.31 ***
2.82 0.94
R – regional 1.47 *** –0.19 **
0.40 0.08
approximation error 4.06 –2.19
4.87 2.11
reweighting error –1.09 0.24
1.65 0.85
Notes: see Table 5.1.
Source: SIAB (1975–2008). 
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6 Conclusive remarks
This dissertation investigates two aspects of economic mobility, intergenerational 
economic mobility and intragenerational economic mobility. It consists of four 
independent articles. The first three contributions focus on intergenerational 
economic mobility.
First, I show that the level of intergenerational mobility is similar in Germany 
and the US. Based on recent highly comparable data, I estimate intergenerational 
earnings elasticities for both countries. Although I can reproduce the low estimates 
shown in the prior literature on Germany, these are not robust against variations 
in sampling criteria. In all cases the difference between the US and Germany is 
not significant. Further, in both countries, I find no evidence for nonlinearities 
along the distribution of father’s earnings. In addition, I apply an unconditional 
quantile regression to assess if the effect of the father’s earnings varies at different 
percentiles of the distribution of son’s earnings. As discussed in chapter 2, the son’s 
earnings are the outcome of the intergenerational transmission process. Although 
the structure differs in the two countries, in both cases, my results show high 
mobility at the bottom of the distribution of son’s earnings. This means, that, in 
both countries, ending up in the lower part of the earnings distribution is a severe 
risk for all sons irrespective of the earnings position of their fathers.
Second, I add to the literature the first estimates of sibling correlations in 
permanent earnings in Germany. In chapter 3, I discuss sibling correlations as an 
alternative measure of intergenerational mobility. I argue that especially in the 
context of intergenerational mobility as indicator of equality of opportunities, 
sibling correlations should be preferred over the standard intergenerational 
elasticities. Again the results are presented within a cross–country comparison. The 
estimates confirm the finding in chapter 2 that intergenerational mobility is similar 
in Germany and the US. In addition, I compare both countries to Denmark and find 
significant differences.
Third, motivated by these variations in mobility levels among different 
countries, I investigate whether cultural background is an important determinant 
of the level of intergenerational mobility. Relying on unique Danish administrative 
data on second generation immigrants, I can conclude that cultural background is 
not a major determinant of the level of mobility. Instead the institutional framework 
seems to be more important.
The last contribution focuses on intragenerational economic mobility. The 
article investigates the development of wage mobility in East and West Germany. In 
a situation of rising wage inequality we find declining wage mobility in both parts 
of Germany. Initially, after German unification, East Germany shows a high level 
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of wage mobility, which rapidly declined to West German levels and even beyond. 
We find that a substantial part of this decline in East Germany is associated with 
changes in observable characteristics, particularly job stability and employment 
characteristics.
Although establishing policy implications was not the primary aim of this 
dissertation, the four articles contain implications for both, future research 
and politics. Again I start with the results on intergenerational mobility. The 
information where Germany is located on the scale of intergenerational mobility 
is important for social policy makers. The findings in this dissertation show that 
intergenerational mobility in Germany is of a similar level compared to the US and 
significant lower compared to Denmark. However, this information is limited as 
from the cross–country comparisons it is unclear, which factors determine the level 
of mobility. A first step to a more detailed policy advice is taken in chapter 4. The 
results indicate that it is the institutional setting and not cultural differences that 
are important determinants in the intergenerational transmission process. Thus, 
high or low intergenerational mobility is not a predetermined characteristic of a 
society, but can be influenced by means of policy. To derive more specific policy 
advice, future research should more explicitly try to identify the most important 
institutions.
The second part of the dissertation also provides relevant information for 
policy. We highlight that the increase in wage inequality in both parts of Germany 
is accompanied by a decline in wage mobility. Thus potential welfare effects of the 
rising inequality are not balanced by higher wage mobility. Again further research 
is needed to derive more detailed advice. Our results show that a substantial part of 
the decline is associated with changes in the unobservable wage structure. Future 
research should try to identify the determinants of these changes.
In the introduction, I motivated the research on economic mobility with the 
idea of equality of opportunities. At the very end of this dissertation I want to 
pick up this motivation and conclude. What we have learnt from the presented 
findings is: the prior result in the literature on intergenerational mobility, that 
Germany shows a high or medium level of equality of opportunities has to be 
denied. According to my results, Germany is among the countries with the lowest 
level of equality of opportunities. In addition, this situation is accompanied by 
falling intragenerational economic mobility. Therefore, as argued above, future 
research should focus on providing more detailed policy advice on how to improve 
equality of opportunities in Germany.
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Abstract
This book investigates two aspects of economic mobility: intergenerational economic 
mobility and intragenerational economic mobility. It consists of four independent 
essays whereby the first three focus on intergenerational economic mobility.
In the first, it is shown that the level of intergenerational mobility is similarly 
low in Germany and the US. Although the prior estimates indicating high 
intergenerational mobility in Germany can be reproduced, these are not robust 
against variations in sampling criteria. In all cases the difference between the US 
and Germany is not significant. Further, in both countries, there is no evidence for 
the existence of nonlinearities along the distribution of fathers’ earnings. Instead, it 
appears that the effect of the fathers’ earnings varies at different percentiles of the 
distribution of sons’ earnings. Although the structure differs in the two countries, 
in both cases, the results show high mobility at the bottom of the distribution of 
sons’ earnings. This means, that, in both countries, ending up in the lower part of the 
earnings distribution is a severe risk for all sons irrespective of the earnings position 
of their fathers.
Second, sibling correlations as an alternative measure of intergenerational 
mobility are discussed. It is argued that, especially in the context of intergenerational 
mobility as an indicator of equality of opportunities, sibling correlations should be 
preferred over the standard intergenerational elasticities. Again the results are 
presented within a cross-country comparison. The estimates confirm the finding 
that intergenerational mobility is similar in Germany and the US. In addition, both 
countries are compared to Denmark where significantly higher mobility is found.
Third, motivated by these variations in mobility levels among different countries, 
it is investigated whether cultural background is an important determinant of the 
level of intergenerational mobility. Relying on unique Danish administrative data on 
second generation immigrants, it can be concluded that cultural background is not 
a major determinant of the level of mobility. Instead the institutional framework 
seems to be more important.
Fourthly, the last essay focuses on intragenerational economic mobility. It 
examines the development of wage mobility in the eastern and western parts of 
Germany. In a situation of rising wage inequality, the results show declining wage 
mobility in both parts of Germany. Initially, after German unification, the eastern 
part showed a high level of wage mobility, which rapidly declined to western 
German levels and even beyond. A substantial part of this decline in the eastern part 
of Germany is associated with changes in observable characteristics, particularly job 
stability and employment characteristics.
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Kurzfassung
Dieses Buch untersucht zwei Aspekte ökonomischer Mobilität, intergenerationale 
ökonomische Mobilität und intragenerationale ökonomische Mobilität. Es besteht 
aus vier unabhängigen Aufsätzen. Die ersten drei beschäftigen sich schwerpunkt-
mäßig mit intergenerationaler Mobilität.
Im ersten Beitrag wird gezeigt, dass die USA und Deutschland ein ähnlich niedri-
ges Niveau an intergenerationaler Einkommensmobilität aufweisen. Die in der Lite-
ratur bestehenden Ergebnisse hoher Durchlässigkeit in Deutschland können zwar 
repliziert werden, es zeigt sich aber, dass diese nicht robust gegenüber Variationen in 
der Stichprobenabgrenzung sind. In allen Modellspezifikationen ist der Unterschied 
zwischen den USA und Deutschland nicht signifikant. Weiterhin gibt es in beiden 
Ländern keine Evidenz für die Existenz von Nichtlinearitäten entlang der Einkom-
mensverteilung der Väter. Stattdessen zeigt sich, dass der Effekt des väterlichen 
Einkommens entlang der Einkommensverteilung der Söhne variiert. Obwohl sich die 
Struktur in den beiden Ländern unterscheidet, zeigen die Ergebnisse in beiden Fällen 
hohe Mobilität am unteren Ende der Einkommensverteilung der Söhne. Das bedeu-
tet, dass es für Söhne unabhängig von der Einkommensposition ihrer Väter eine 
ernste Gefahr ist, am unteren Ende der Einkommensverteilung positioniert zu sein.
Im zweiten Beitrag werden Geschwisterkorrelationen als alternative Maßzahl 
zur Ermittlung intergenerationaler Mobilität diskutiert. Diese sind, speziell im Kon-
text einer Interpretation intergenerationaler Mobilität als Indikator für Chancen-
gleichheit, dem Standardansatz, der Berechnung intergenerationaler Elastizitäten, 
vorzuziehen. Analog zum ersten Beitrag werden die Ergebnisse in einem Mehr-
ländervergleich präsentiert. Es bestätigt sich, dass die intergenerationale Mobilität 
in den USA und Deutschland auf einem ähnlich niedrigen Niveau liegt. Ebenso zeigt 
sich, dass in Dänemark eine signifikant höhere Durchlässigkeit besteht.
Der dritte Beitrag untersucht potenztielle Determinanten der Höhe der inter-
generationalen Mobilität. Auf Grundlage administrativer Daten von Migranten zwei-
ter Generation in Dänemark kann gezeigt werden, dass der kulturelle Hintergrund 
keinen wesentlichen Einfluss auf die Höhe der intergenerationalen Mobilität hat. 
Stattdessen scheinen die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen wichtiger zu sein.
Der vierte Beitrag fokussiert auf intragenerationale ökonomische Mobilität. Er 
untersucht die Entwicklung von Lohnmobilität in Ost- und Westdeutschland. In ei-
ner Zeit steigender Lohnungleichheit zeigen die Ergebnisse sinkende Lohnmobilität 
in beiden Teilen Deutschlands. Unmittelbar nach der Wiedervereinigung zeigt sich 
in Ostdeutschland ein sehr hohes Niveau an Lohnmobilität, das rapide absinkt und 
sogar unter das Westniveau fällt. Ein substantieller Teil dieses Rückgangs ist mit 
Veränderungen in beobachtbaren Charakteristika, insbesondere der Jobstabilität 
und Beschäftigungscharakteristika, verbunden.
